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P !^  R T 
INTRODUCTION 1 
According to common usage the term 
disarmament is synonymous uith reduotldn of arma-
ments* 
The word disarmament is used to cover 
four distinct conceptions* (l) The penal destruc-
tion or reduction of the armament of a country 
defeated in war* (2) Bilateral disarmament agreements 
applying to specific geographic areas* (3) The 
complete abolition of all armaments and (4) The 
reduction and limitation of national armament by 
general international agreement* Disarmament is the 
central problem of our time* More than 50 yearst the 
United Nations has csrried an unremitting known tech-
nique of negotiation to achieve the goal* Uhlle progress 
in these efforts have been slow* nuclear technology has 
progressed at a formidable pace and is now within the 
reach of a growing number of countries* fleanwhilet the 
arms racet both in conventional and nuclear weapons goes 
on* It ppses a continual threat to peace and also has a 
profoundly unaetting effect on a generation which knows 
that its civilization can be sxtingulshfed within a few 
hours of the start of a new war* 
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Disarmament i s a o o l l t i c a l p rocess t h a t 
poses a p o l i t i c a l orobleffl • t h e most imoor tant and 
t h e most d i f f i c u l t one conf ron t ing t h e world today . 
The s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem *f disarmsment i s not goino 
t o be reached in near fu tu re* I t r e q u i r e s g e n e r a t i o n s 
be fore t h e n a t i o n s become convinced t h a t they can l i v e 
i n peace with one another* and so proceed to get r i d 
of t h e f a n t a s t i c weapons t h a t w i l l have developed* 
TH£ HISTORY OF WEGOTIftTIOWS F ^ DISftffWftWCWTt 
Disarmament i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e Rush -
Bagct agreement between the United S t a t e s and Crest 
B r i t a i n . S ince 1817, has kept t h e Great Lakes and 
t h e U.S .* Canadian boarder d isarmed. 
iKfter t h e explos ion of t h e f i r s t atomic 
bombs In 1945 and t h e r a o i d develooment of nuc lea r 
weapons of mass d e a t r u c t i o n f such as i n t ^ r - c o n t l n e n t a l 
m i s s i l e s , t h e problem of disarmament became a t once 
more u r g e n t . In conseouencet t h e r e were t a l k s at imny 
l e v e l s of t h e nped for g e n e r s l disarmMient . After 
1945 t h e r e was a change, t h e con ten t ion t h a t armaments 
r a c e s i n e v i t a b l y led t o war r ep l aced by t h e argiwent 
t h a t t h e use of nuc lea r weapons in q u a n t i t y t h r e a t e n e d 
c i v i l i z a t i o n i t t c l f * 0 » 8 0 i t e t h i s r«a l izat ion» a 
• o lut ion t o the oroblaai of ditarmament eontlnupd to 
depand on ikutual eenfidcnce* 
OiaarnaiRant and tha l 9 i 9 Sett lementt 
It was part ly at a react ion agalnat the 
arm race in furope that diaarnament was streaaed in 
making v e r a a l l i e a sett lement* Uoodrou Uilton*e 14 
pointa demanded that nat ional armaments be reduced to 
the ' lowest point cons i s t ent with domestic sa fe ty '* 
A.rticle 8 of the covenant of League of Nation .4hsnQed 
the 'word 'domestic' t o nat ional and added t o the 
point of 'nat ional s a f e t y ' * In t h i s way the disarma-
ment problem waa l inked more d i r e c t l y with the problem 
of secur i ty* 
Disarmament and League of Nationst 
The attempt to secure agreement on general 
disarmament through the League of Nations passed through 
three phases . The f i r s t period of committee work lasted 
from 1920 to 1925* The second period from 1925 to 1932 
was marked by the slow progress of the prepatory 
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commission for th« diternamsnt conference* The third 
period from 1932 to 1934, use thet of ditarmament 
conference itself, which was never formally brought to 
close* At the beginning of the first oeriod a non-
governmental temoorary mixed commission was set uo and 
proceeded in 1923 to dray up a draft treaty of mutual 
assistance* Uhen this ya9 failed to secure adoption, 
it was replaced by the Geneva protocol of 1924* In 
December 1925 the council set up a preparatory 
commission for the disarmament conference, which met for 
the first time in 1926. Progress was slow, but In I93n 
an agreement was reached on main points, budgetory 
limitation of armament expenditure, the limitation of 
land, sea, and air forces* The most imoortant stages 
in the history of agreements were the aoceotanee in 
3uly 1932 of a limited agreement* (l) That air 
attack against civilian populations should be 
absolutely prohibited* (?) That heavy artillery anti 
tanks should in principie be limited in size* 
Disarmament and United Nationst 
The founding members of the United Nations, 
meeting in Sen Francisco on 26 3une 1945 to sign the 
cherter» solemnly conmlttpd theiR««lve« Is'^ to maintain 
international peace and security"* For this puroosst 
they conferred specific responsibilities in connection 
uith disarmament and the regulation of armaments on 
Security Council and the General Assembly* The 
Security Council uas made responsible for formulations, 
with the assistance of the 'nilitary Staff Committee*, 
plans to submitted to the members of the United Nations 
for the establishment of a system for the regulation of 
armaments* The Cpneral Altssembly UBB empowered to 
consider "the principles governing disarmament and the 
regulation of armMients*" 
In 3anuary 1946 for the first session of 
Genpral Aissembly, the delegates reouested to establish 
the Atomic Energy Ccmimisslon* At the first meeting 
U*S*A* proposed the creation of an International 
Atomic Development Authority entrusted with all phases 
of the development and USP of atomic energy* In the 
second meeting a draft was proposed prohibiting the 
production and use of atomic weapons* In 195(7 United 
Nations established 'Disarmament Commission'* The Dis-
armament Commission held its first meeting on 4 February 
1952* The following plans were adopted* (l) rlimination 
of atomic weapons* (2) rlimination of weapons of maas 
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destruction* and (3) Limitation and balanced reduction 
of all other armaments and all armed forces* From 
1959 to 1965 General l^ saembly declared genpral and 
complete disarmament be the basic goal of the U*N*0. 
In 1962 in U.N.O.f Canada, Italy and Mexico 
pressed for priority for the question of the oeaceful 
uses of outer space* Both United States and Soviet 
Union wanted a ban on the olacing of yeaoons of mass 
destruction in orbit* During 1963 sessiont Soviet 
Union announced its readiness to accept the U*S*A* 
proposals for a direct oommunleation links between 
governments of the two countries* 
In 1964 U*S*S*R* in U*N*0* proposed the 
reduction of military budgets in order to gain the 
goal of complete disarmament* The most important 
issue* the withdrsual of foreign troops from the 
territories of other countries and elimination of 
foreign military bases was discussed in session of 
General Assembly in 1966, From 1967 to 1971 the most 
important issue of the General Assembly and Security 
Council was nuclear testing* 
Th« nuclvar •xolotion of India in 1974 cr«8t»d 
m s»t back to tha Unitad Nationa for tha naQotiation on 
tha diaarManant* 
PROPosftLs rm HUCLCAR DisftWft«f«iTr 
Total diaarnaiRant waa a t i l i not daclarad 
by the U«N» Aiaeawbiy* Nuclaar waapona ara ao danqaroua 
and wHiia thay a t l l l a x i a t , tha r i ak w i l l ba uaad 
ramaina ao graat* 
Curopaan Aitoaiic Induatr iaat 
In t948 thara waa no ate«iic induatry in any 
country axcapt tha tl*S*ft* Today 13 countriaa hava l^r^a 
aoala induatr iaa* By tha and of 1978 the world w i l l 
heva 150 high capacity raactora* Tha M i l i t a r y aoollca-
t i o n of atoii ic anergy i a tha Qraataat and tha noat 
dangaroua ehenga of a l l * I n 1948 thara waa no nuclaar 
waapona in any country axcapt of boaba* flo t a c t i c a l 
waaoona had baan daviaad and no M i l i t a r y uaa« f^uania 
oroducad har f i r a t H<»boaib in 1949, B r i t a i n in 1957. 
Tha f i a a i l a matar ia l uaad for A-bonba waa adaptad to 
datonata H*bonba by tha lJ»9«n«y tn 19S? by r?uaaian in 
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1953 and by Britain In 1957. But now the situation 
is changed* There are vast stocks of nuclear ueaoonst 
large*scale production snd new countries may soon by 
Joining in. 
Special Problems in Under-Developed Tountriest 
There will be special problems of inspection 
and control in developing and under-developing countries* 
In near future* theae countries be able to create an 
atomic industry of their own. If they could divert 
fissile materials from their nuclear power stationsf they 
might be ablet by hiring foreign technicians* Thpse 
industrial and military change have all made the problem 
of effectively controlling nuclear disarmament more 
difficult. 
Four Obligations of Total Nuclear Disarmament! 
In light of these changes since 1948* can 
a system of total nuclear disarmament be devised* The 
basis of any system of total nuclear disarmament must 
be accffotance by Qovernment by ooiioulsory ob l fqs t l on . 
These ob l iga t ions must be soceoted by a l l nations* The 
four ob l ioa t lons are as f o l l o u s i 
(1) Not to use nuclear weapons in any kind of 
wer* 
(2) Not to t e s t new weapons in exoprlwental 
research* 
(3) Not to make new f i s s i l e material for warllkp 
purpose* 
(4) Not t o stock nuclear weapons 
Ban the Bomb: 
Atceording t o Gromyko the character of t h i s 
weapon i s that i t s employment brines untold misery, 
above e l l to the peaceful population* Hundreds of 
thousands of words had been spoken about banninp the 
btMib* The Russians had urged i t on every s u i t a b l e 
and unsuitable occasiont the western de legates had 
rejected i t with equal vigour* 
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Nuclear Weapons and Internat ional Laut 
Nuclear ueapona cannot be reconci led 
u i th the p r i n c i p l e s declared by Hugo Grotiue in 
the 17th Cf codi f ied by the 19th c*t conventions 
and r e - s t a t e d by Anthony rden in h i s draft disarma-
Kent convention of 1933# The Br i t i sh Government, 
u i th the universal consent of other nat ions* then 
declared as "an es tabl i shed ru le of in ternat iona l 
law*** That any use of ooisonous incendiary or bacter ia l 
weapons against s t a t e and in any war, whatever i t s 
character was prohibited* 
The Western GoverniRent's View 
The Russian de legates have srgued t h i s l ega l 
cass so u n s k i l f u l l y that the Western Governments have 
never thought i t necessary to reply* Their arguments 
have been of quite a d i f f eren t kind. 
Western Gove^rranents says that ban the bomb 
atisans disarm the demoGraciea* and added that no weapon 
i s i l l e g i t i m a t e in s e l f - d e f e n c e againat a nation* Mhen 
a system of t o t a l nuclear disarmament has been devised 
11 
and adeptedf th»r« will b« no difficulty about "Banning 
the Banb«** 
TESTS: 
M ban on tas t s ia a naeaaaary aa part of a 
ditamanant prograiaiRa* UHat makea nuclear taats dlffarant 
froR axpariiianta with othar waapona ie tha fal l-out and 
tha dangar to hiMan health. Up to the end of 1978, 6 
countriea had conducted teats* The numbpr of testa ia 
not being reduced from year to year» but on the contrary, 
i t has tended to increaae* 
The Oamage Done to Human Healtht 
All radiation ia harmful, in greater or 
leaaer degree, to human health* iccording to Profeaaor 
Rotblat that each tes t of an H»>bamb wil l ultimately 
result in cancer of bone* Dr C*8* Lewis of the 
California Inatitute of Technology says that there ia 
8 direct l inear relationship between the amount of 
radiation received by a peraon and the occurrence 
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of Leukaemlat a fatal dlaeat* of the uHlte cella* 
Dsmaga to the Cltizene of the Non*Nuclear Pouarst 
The president of the World Health 
Qrganiaatlon asyt that the greatest danger from 
radiation in nuclear age night cone in the under-
developed regions of the wnltl not fully prepared to 
cope with i t* rai l -out fron teats i s carried al l 
round the world by the upper air currents* It i s not 
without reason that 29 nations of the Afro«>li8ian 
group and moat of whom ar# 'under-developed' and un-
protected pretested against the policy of nuclenr 
powers and demanded the stopoing of tes ts* 
Nuclear Tests and the Arms Racet 
Every new explosion of an A-or H-bonb 
leada to the speeding up of the atomio weapons race* 
The purpose of t e s t s i9 to make the nuclear weapons 
oheaperf more eff ic ientf more versat i le and more oower-
fu l , per k.g* of f i s s i l e material* Dr Uillard F. Libby 
said that the development of new weapons would be 
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crippled by a cessation of tests* 
Dr Cduard Teller says that if a nation 
uanta to carry out testa in secrpcyi observation will 
become difficult and uncertain* 
The Case For Continuing TestsS 
If soine nations want to continue testa* 
not only because other nations night disloyally conduct 
teatsf and so gain a military advantagsf but also 
because further testa will out into a ooaition to fight 
opponent's uar machine while sparing the innocent by 
atandarda* Further testa will also help to oroduce 
nuclear anti-aircraft weaponsf clean explosives for 
peaceful usei and so on* Each added amount of 
radiation causes damage to the health of human bainga 
all over the world and lead to sn increase in the 
number of ssrioualy defective children that will be 
born in future generations* Wn International agree-
ment to stop all testing of nuclear weapons could 
serve as a firat step towards a more general disarma-
ment and the effective abolition of nuclear weapons* 
and averting the posaibillty of a nuclear war* 
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The Danger of DlverBlon and ^fcrpt ^tocWs 
y^mn Uestern Covernnents abandoned the orlqlnal 
UN Plan for in ternat ional ownerahlo and manaqementt *^^^ 
acceoted inspect ion inatead for the control of new o^oduction 
of f i s a i l e n a t e r i a l f they recoonieed thnt t h i s Inaoection 
might not be irj'5 per cent e f f e c t i v e Bnii thp»t they must acce^Jt 
the r i sk of the d ivers ion of a small oart of the mpterlal to 
warlike use* 
The Danger of Diversion of New Production J 
B r i t i s h de legates t o the UN Disarmament Sub-
committee said that h i s government would accent a system of 
i n s p e c t i o n , but he added *X do not claim to know of a ayatem 
of control which would be ntrt e f f e c t i v e in t h i s f i e l d * . 
The f igures of the actual output of nuclear 
mater ia l s t are of course* not published} but there ia other 
United States information on which a rouoh est imate may bp mede* 
In 1978 USfeff! reported that the oroductinn of uranium ore in 
U«^. was A^,7f}6p1'^^ dry t o n e s . In the same y a r , United «tptP8 
m i l l s oroHuced 491,946,111 tons of uranium concentr»»tes« The 
phrase uranitMi concentrates i s ambiguous, i t orobably means 
uranium oxide* But the d e s t r u c t i v e power of a amount o^ f l a p i l p 
material can be much increased, i f i t i s us^'d in H-bomba* 
The Danger of I l l i c i t s tocks ! 
• r * Oopenheimer and others of the view t h ^ t , i f 
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d i f f i c u l t y uhpn i t u«« agreed to? the rtl^ficulty pbout 
secret stocks* It i s imnosslble to rtlscover whpt to tp l 
pes t aroduction way hnve beent i f the oroducer upnts to 
hide i t . 
s d i s l o y a l ooverrmient could declare th<»t I t s 
stock of Plutonium or U ?3'S were 1'K leaa thsn In fpct th^y 
were* f?nd could be surei on technica l orounds, th^t i ta word 
would not be challenged* It i s well-known th^t the nroHuction 
of atomic energy for oe^ceful ouroosea can bp used for th» 
aceiNnul^tion of s tocks of e x o l o s i v e atomic mpter la l s , pnri 
moreover# in ever greater ouant i t i e s* 
Thus there are o o s a l b i l l t t e s beyond the reach 
of internat ional control for evadino t h i s control pnr^ fnr 
organising the c landes t ine manufacture of atomic pnri hydrogen 
weaoonsf even i f th»»re i s a formal aoreement on Intprnptinnsl 
control* 
Thus we can say th»t no nst inn could weree thpt all 
nuclear wesoons should be removed from the fpce of th«» »»arth, 
i f i t meant that in the ten yesrs i^ead* and In the decades 
thereafter» some nation mioht have and exerc i s e P tremendnua 
overpowering mi l i tary face agslnpt nil other nationa s o l e l y hy 
reason of having within i t s hands a clandeattn^ly develf^ed 
anti prcret ive ly maintained atorp house of multi-meoatfon homba. 
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The Cut-off: 
Uhen the Uestern Governments changed the ir 
po l icy and U»N« Ditarnament Sub-Committee reached dead* 
lock over the question of secre t nuclear stocks* H 
proposal was proposed that the dead-lock should be 
broken by an agreement t o stop the new production of 
nuclear mater ia ls for warlike use* 
OTHER UEJIPONS Of WRSS OFSTRUCTIOMj 
U*N* Commission on conventional armaments 
adopted the fol lowing d e f i n i t i o n * 
"Weapons of mass-destruct ion should be 
defined to include atomic exp los ive weeponst rad io -
act ive* material weapons* l e t h a l chpmicel ^6 biolo< 
g i e a l weapons* 
Chemical Oisarmamentt 
From pr imi t ive times* thp use of poison 
had besn forbidden by the laws of war* and the laws 
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hari b««n obeyed* For the first tine Cerman used poison 
gas at ypres. It cost the British and Canadian 5^,1^ 
casualities* There is no nped to argue that the total 
abolition of ohewical weapons must form part of any dis-
armament treaty* But the technical problems of chemical 
dissrmament have never been fully explored* The subject 
has never been discussed in the U*M* 
Biologiealst 
The United States has published a large 
number of studies on various technical aspects of 
biological warfare* 
Biological agents may be used against 
ment animals or plants* Britain developed her bio-
logical resesrcH at the ministry of supoly station at 
Porton. In 1942 U*S*H* set up a research station at 
Camp Detrick. In short arms race in biological weapons 
has developed with no less intensity than in other 
fields* 
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The Biological Agvntat 
The germs or agents of in fect ion which 
are l i k e l y to be used in b io log ica l war» becter ia t 
protoza» epiroohetat fungi and viruaea* These agents 
have been oonaidered for ooaaible use in uart soms are 
a ir -borne* vector-borne or cont8ct-borne» tough enough 
to "withstand destruction forces'*! and caoable of belno 
produced in bulk* There are only feu b io log ica l agents 
that are su i tab le for d iss in inst ion fron a i r c ra f t * of 
a l l agentSf botulism (food poisoning) and psi t tacosis 
are most l i k e l y to have these character is t ics* botulism 
i s the most deadly poison that a single gram contains 
seven m i l l i o n l e t h a l doses for a man* 
Del ivery of Bio logica l l^gentst 
The cruc ia l problem of b io log ica l warfare 
i s not the production of the agent* but de l ivery* This 
might be done by enemy spies* who could spread Infect ion 
by bringing in diseased animals* po l lu t ing food and soon 
the agents must be del ivered by a i r ccef t * e i ther in 
bomba or by sprays* or by missi les* But on the other 
hand the danger of spraying on the ground, the a ir craf t 
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would have to fly so low that they would be veryv 
vulnerable to ground attack. Other authorities believe 
that lou altitude attacks would have the advantage that 
the air craft fly below the radar screen* The United 
States government submitted a working paper to the UN 
OisariReiient Coiimisslon in which some principles were 
presented* Safeguards must be devised to ensure the 
elimination of bacterial weapons and facilities and 
appliances for their production and use along with the 
elimination of all armed forces* There would have to 
be a clause in the disarmament treaty enjoining on all 
signatory powers the ccmiplete and unconditional re-
nunciation of the right to prepare or possess biologi-
cal weapons of any kind* 
I*)issile8 and flissile Races 
There are two main categories of missiles* 
First, those which like the V/I* approximate to pilot-
less air crafty operate within the earth's atmosoheret 
use the oxygen of the atmosphere in the engines* 
Second, those which approximate to the artillery shell, 
are driven by rocket propulsion, and require no oxygen. 
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They may go up to g r ta t he ights , far outside the 
ear th 's atmosphere, they t r a v e l at immense speeds, uo 
to twenty times the speed of sound. 
n i s s i l e and Disarmafflsntt 
I t i s proposed that missi les that missi les 
should be abolished by the disarmament t r e a t y * Tf 
missi les are abolished, i t w i l l much reduce an aggre-
ssor's hope of a sudden and overwhelming surprise 
attackt I t i s s t i l l be declared policy of a l l govern* 
ments to abolish a l l nuclear weapons* I f I t i s done, 
then most missi les w i l l become quite useless* The 
control would be much simpler and more cer ta in ly 
e f f e c t i v e , i f the manufacture, use and possession of 
a l l missi les were forbidden* In that case, inspection 
could ensure that t reaty was f a i t h f u l l y observed* 
LAiND DlSARWftWCNTl 
Land compaigns have in the past been the 
b loodiest , the c o s t l i e s t , and the most destruct ive pert 
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Of uar* Land armies have absorbed the greater oart 
of the total military budgett Bnd of the manpoupr trained 
to uar* There are four main factors of military atrenoth 
on land, with which a disarmi^ent treaty must deal, man 
powprf the quality and quantity of weapons and ammunition, 
transportt and budgetary appropriations* 
U«N« Consideration of Land Disarmamentt 
The formulation of treaty clauses to deal 
with these factors would present real difficulties, 
and not has been considered in the discussion in the 
U.N. There is no guidance to be found in the U.N. 
debates about the methods by which land disarmament 
can be carried out. 
The treaty of verssilles imposed provisionally 
unilateral disarmament and defeated Germany, it was 
designed to deal with the moat efficient army thp world 
had ever seen. 
The Principles of Land Disarmament Todayi 
The proposals made for land disarmament 
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betuven the wars have been described for two reasons* 
rlrstf they produced* In British draft convention, the 
technical solutions for the oroblews of conventional 
land disarmament that are rsQulred today* Second, the 
British draft convention wss oroduced at a moment of doubt 
and eonfuttion* 
iN«?pt:cTiow mo CONTROLt 
Inspection and control are the crux of the 
disarmament problem today* It Is widely bellevtd that 
no progress has been made In U*N* because Russia has 
rejected all proposals for Inspsctlon and control which 
the Western Governments have made* The proposals for 
Inspection end control were simply concerned with the 
detection of violations of the disarmament treaty* The 
first U*N. /i^ ssembly sdopted a resolution asking the 
security council to expedite consideration of s draft 
convention for the creation of an international system 
of controls and inspection as essential to the genpral 
reduction of armaments* 
23 
In«p«otion and Intvllioancet 
There Is every reaton to exDect« that an 
Inspeetlen ayatam sucH aa Ruaaiana propoaed would be 
able to dlaoover all but the moat petty Infrlnpementa 
of the treaty* For It muat be remembered that the UN 
aystem would aupolementf and not reolacet the aecret 
aervicea which moat oountriea maintain. It ia aaid 
that the N*TO intelligence aervicc haa known about 
every Ruasian nuclear test, about Ruasian orogreaa in 
guided miasilesy about the development of aubmarinea 
etc* Governments could make available to the UN 
control adminlatration any information obtained by 
their agents about violations of a disarmament treatyt 
with thia guidance the UN Inapectora could hardly fail 
to eatabliah the facta* 
Inapeotion and Diaarmamentt 
The Ruaaiana have urged that it tiould be 
eaaier to aettle detailed oroviaions of en Inaoection 
ayatem when the detailed reductiona of armamenta have 
been agreed* Ueatern governmenta will be in better 
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p o s i t i o n for urging the imoortancs of control when they 
have made bolder and more d e f i n i t e prooosals for the 
reduction which are t o be control led* Further United 
S ta te s urged that diaarmament i s carriedf the aimoler 
and mors e f f e c t i v e control w i l l become* 
Thue at the present s tage the oroblem of 
general and oomolete disarmament ia a d v i s ^ l e t o 
examine a l l i t s aspects in d e t a i l , including the 
d e t a i l s of contro l . Thpre should be agreement in 
p r i n c i o l e s on the oart of a l l s t a t e s to the orooosale 
for general and comolpte disarmament* 
COLLfCTlVC SECURITY? 
It has been accepted s ince the early daya 
of the League of flations that disarmament and c o l l e c t i v e 
securi ty must go together* fkt presents s t a t e s are ^ree 
t o make the maximum mi l i tary effort of which they ar»» 
capable to defend themsrlves agpinat at tack; they wi l l 
not renounce t h i s freedom unle8!« they rece ive other 
guarantees instead* Some of them are as f o l l o w s : 
0 (t 
( l ) The RestrsinlnQ Power of the Lawt 
Dlsarwpment la l o o l r e l conseouence of the 
dec i s ion to s u b s t i t u t e the ru le of lay for the rule 
of armed forces* The system of the IJM i s found on the 
fundamental obl loat iona of oaraoreohs 3 and 4 of 
A r t i c l e of 2 of the Charter. «ccordlng to charter 
that a l l membera sha l l s e t t l e the ir internat ional 
disputes by peaceful meana in such a manner that 
in ternat ional peace and s e c u r i t y , and j u a t i c e t are not 
endangned* The reatrainlno pow^r of th ia law muat 
depend on the degree t o wblch the member nationa honour 
the ir ob l iga t ions t and on the qeneral atithorlty and 
p r e s t i g e of the UN, 
(?) Disarmament and Secur i ty : 
If the general disarmament treaty brnuoht 
about a fa i r and balanced al l -round reduction of arma-
mentSf with riemllitarlaed lonee in daroerous o laces mnd 
an e f f e c t i v e syatem of Inspect ion , i t would i t s e l f 
increase the secur i ty of the aionptory n a t i o n s . 
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(3) U«M» Internst ional Force* 
^n Internat ional Force have es tab l i shed 
In 1956. In 1956 the UN emergency force was es tab-
l i shed in S ina i as an ad hoc measure to deal with war* 
And now a permament Internat ional force came into 
ex is tence* These forces should cons i s t of lonct^term 
volunteerst recrui ted by U«N* and i t should be 
organised on an in ternat iona l bas i s t with auotas for 
d i f f erent nations* t o ensure a f a i r balance* Thus 
in t h i s way the ex i s t ence of a permamant UN interna-
t i o n a l force would be important guarantee for the 
secur i ty of a l l s t a t e s which l e g a l l y carried out the ir 
ob l iga t ions under a disarmament treaty* 
C o l l e c t i v e Actions 
^o meet the danger* i t should be agreed 
by a l l the nat ions ii^ich s ign the dlsarmitfient treaty 
that they w i l l take c o l l e c t i v e action by a l l means at 
the ir d i sposa l to hal t the aggress ion, or t o crush i t , 
i f i t goes on* This o b l i g a t i o n should be world-wide, 
through the use of some kinds of armed forces might be 
organised on a regional bas i s* Thus at the present 
stage* the problew of general and complete disarnainent 
i s advisable to observe by a l l s t a t e s and there should 
be agreement in pr inc ip l e on part of a l l s t a t e s to the 
proposal for genpral and comolete disarmamentf snti i t 
w i l l not be d i f f i c u l t to work out an agreement acceptable 
to a l l nations* 
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THo U»S«*>Sovlet s t ra tegic nuclear weapons race 
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Japan uses i ts /energy for peaceful purpose. 
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r e a l i z e that arme control measures w i l l not simplify 
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and th» complexity of defence problems. Arms control 
policy must adopt a rational aporoach to ensure national 
security* The discussion of limitation of strateolc 
arms bring up the ouestlon what Is superiority and Is 
there any value in Itf considering the levels of numbers 
involved* 
6* BARNPT (Richard 3). Behind the SALT fiasco* Progressive* 
41, 6; 3une, 1977? 6-7* 
The author concluiles that recent collapse of the "^ ALT 
talks is due to U*!5.-Soviet relations? dnmpstic political 
pressures in both countries and arm race* One of the 
Inherent flaws in SALT frame-work is that the pace of 
weapons technology is much faster than the pace of 
diplomatic negotiations. Every day a new type of weaoons 
are discovered and manufactured* 
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U*N* on development and Aissembly discussion of the reoort, 
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l^ssociations for the United Nations* It Is desirable 
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a formidable task* 
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Thp author concludes that an arm race without aooarent 
end, a race for Increasing mi l i tary s u o e r l o r l t y . The 
super pouters have clready passed the point of no return. 
The t e s t ban treaty and non-pro l i f erat ion treaty have not 
Inhibited e i ther of the two great s ignatory powers nor 
the two great non-signatory powers in t h e i r search for 
nat ional secur i ty through the development of nuclear 
ueaoons* 
9. BETTER TREATY Is worth waiting for. Nature. 7^9, ?ni : 
Feb., 19, 1976? 517-18. 
This a r t i c l e d i s cusse s environmental war fare , which 
w i l l be highl ight in the United Nations' conference of 
the committee on disarmament. The super powers shpuld 
be to ld to work Put something more meaninoful in which 
research and development for peaceful purpose i s o lven. 
1(1. BURT (Richard). "^.ft.L.T. a f ter Vladivostok. P u l l , of 
Pea. Pro. 13, 5; Feb . , 1975; 52-58. 
The agreement between U.S. and U.5.5.R. r e a l l y splves the 
s t r a t e g i c problems of mi l i tary planners of those countries-
The problem for the U.S. I s to maintain e s s e n t i a l 
egulvalence with U.S.S.R. But at the same time the agree-
ment i s disturbing feature that i t al lows for increase r a -
therthan decreases In arras l e v e l s . 
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11. BURT (Richard). SALT 2 and offensive force levels. 
Orbis. 18, 2; Way, 1974J 465-67. 
The article examines the existence of offensive nuclear 
forces in U.S.A. and Soviet Union. This is the bitjoest 
problem facing the S»LT II negotiators. The main objectives 
of SAULT II are to achieve permanent ceiling on offensive 
forces and control on offensive weapons. The author 
points out that SAtLT I uas not effective to bring about 
nuclear forces reduction. The negotiations results 
achieved in SRLT II conform with previous findings regarding 
the underlying conditions- strategic, political, technologi-
cal, economic - which seemed to help arms control 
negotiation. 
12. BURT ( R . ) . The cruise missile and arms control. Survival. 
18, 1; 3an-Feb, l976j 10-15. 
The author concludes that the characteristics of the 
cruise missile, versatility and performance have 
stimulated wide ranging proposals of how it might be 
utilized to defence. The cruise missile weapons could 
lower the idea to use force. Ai missile system calls 
for very large resources, tven small, short range 
missiles are very costly* e.g.» British costs £30,om 
and United States £60,000. The control would be much 
simpler and more effective, if the manufacture, use and 
possession of all missile were forbidden. 
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13* CAHN (Anne H)« Th« •••reh for a new handle of arme 
oontrol. Bul l , of the Ato» Sele» 30, 4; Apr, 1974| 7-9. 
Thle ar t i c l e la a report on the ooneludlnc; eesaion of 
the etudy on new direction in ariRa control held at 
yiaeonein, in November 1973* The oarticipanta emohaala 
on the theory that ame control beglne at htmie* Develoolno 
countriea argued that nuolpar countriee ehould direct the 
arM control policy rather than forcing the non-nuclear 
countriea to l i n i t their arne* 
14» CAiRTCT (B)« Uhat next in ariRa control. Orbie. 17, 1j 
Sep, 1973; 178-196. 
The author concludee that i t i e neither uiee nor 
neceaaery for the United Statee to focua hepea for 
further progreaa in arme control or in reduced inter-
national teneione on the recent proliferation of 
conferencee and negotiatione - eepecially the European 
aecurity conference, the talkb on Mutual and Balanced 
force Reduction (hSFR) and SALT !! • 
15. CARTER (3iiiiRiy)» Arme control and the 1976 preaidentlal 
e lect ion, nrwe cent* Today. 6, lOt Oct, I976t 1-5. 
The author concludee that mutual balance of terror ia an 
inadequate foundation for a peaceful and atable world order. 
A poeitive arme control program ie aleo needed. Ultimately 
nuclear weapona ehould be eliminated, but immediate reliance 
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on the» should b» reduced* Terrorltm in the global 
set t ing has beoowe the predomlnent for * of confrontation 
between d i f f e r i n g sub-categories of societ ies that spek 
to overcome each other* 
16* CHAYES ( A ) * Nuclesr arms control a f te r the cold uar* 
Oafcdalus* 104, 3? Way, 1975? 15*33. 
The author concludes that a general survey of the 
prospects for arms control over the coming decades on 
the assumption that US-Soviet confrontat ion in the cold 
uar mode w i l l not recur* Under these eircumstanceSf both 
in the sdvancsd and developing world, cent r i fuga l forces 
w i l l predominate* Under a system of nuclear control led 
only by inspection there i s a double r i s k , diversion of 
f i s s i l e mater ia l from new production and d is loyal r e -
tent ion of a secret stock* 
17* CLARKt (Duncsn L)* The p o s s i b i l i t i e s of arms control* 
DialOQUt* 10, 2J 1977| 38-48* 
The author examines the d i f f e r e n t points of view regarding 
the f e s s i b i l l t y of srms control are viewed that there is 
ground for hope i f e f f o r t s are continuous and mad* in 
good f a i t h * Past e f f o r t s are reviewed and some indicat ions 
of futurs d i rect ions are given* The greatest challenge the 
human race has ever faced i s the to co-operate in d i s -
armament; that we must solve the problem of l i v i n g together 
or we won*t l i v e * 
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18« CLFWPIS (Ualttr C)» Puroptan arms control. Inter. b« 
27, 1; Oae, 1971; 45-50. 
Th« author otmcludaa that Sovlat Union and Its alliea 
want to convana a turopean aeourity eonferanca* Thia 
conferanee could eatabliah a parnenent Curopean aacurity 
coRMisaiont which could plan tactical nuclear diaarnaiRent* 
Ruaaian argued on thia topic but wettern governatenta have 
never thought it neeeeaary to reply. 
19. COTFEY (3.1). Arma control and wllitary balance in turope. 
Orbit. 17, i; Sep., 1973; 132-34. 
The author tees there ia demanda in weatern and Eaatern 
rurope for arma control. Thta it due to the burden of 
ftilitary cxpenditurea on eoonoaiy. U.S.5.R and U.S.ff. 
ahould avoid a Military eon front at ion a and to prevent the 
outbreak of nuclear war. The author further exaaiinea that 
super powers can Make a aignifioant contribution to the 
limitation of arma and preserve peace* 
20. COFFEY (3.I.). Strategic arma limitationa and ruropean 
aecurity. Inter, hff. 47, 4; Oct, 1971; 692-700. 
The author concludes that recently there has been 
interest shown by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in limiting 
strategic armaments* Coffey identifies and evaluates the 
impact on the strategic balance of four types of arms 
control currently under considerstion. (1) Not to use 
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nuoJlvar w«apim>t I n any kind of uaf (?) Not to taat nau 
waapona i n axparii iantal raamBtehm (3) Not to aiaka naw 
f i a a i l a ot fuaionabla n a t a r i a l for y a r l i k a ourooaa* 
(4 ) Not to atook nuolaar waapona* 
2 1 . DAVIS (Paul C)* A Curopaan nuelaar forea* Orbta* 17, i f 
Sap* I973f 11»1*113. 
Tha author coneludaa that turopa ahould hava i t a o i^ 
nuclaar forea t o protaet i t a a l f * Thara ara forma of 
oooparation poaaibla batwaan tha B r i t i a h and franca nuolaar 
foreaa* Tha nead for a ruropp an nuclaar forca ahould b« 
aaaaaaad by two o r i t a r i a * ( l ) Should i t atran^than tha 
war f i ^ h t l n f capacity of NP^ TO countriaa and would I t naka 
an important p o l i t i c a l et»ntribution t o tha eonfidanca of 
waatarn Curopaan nationa in t h a i r aaeur i ty* 
22» OOUGMCRTY (^amaa r ) . Arma control in the I97f3«a« Orbia. 
15, I I Saol 19711 194-19B. 
Tha author axaninaa tha oroblaaa which a r iaa in any 
naQOtiatitma ovar dlaamaiiant &n^ ooint out that with 
franca «id China, thara ara not tevmn diaeuaalona y a t . nor»* 
ovar tha nuolaar non«»orolifaration t raa ty haa not bean 
•i^nrnd by a nuwbar of natiena eapabla of makinq nuclaar 
waapona* 
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2 3 . eTZOtO (T«H)» I l l u s i o n and hop« AriRa l i M i t e t i o n and 
peace* Pee* and Charot* 1» 2t Seot 1973? 79-8fJ. 
THe author points out that oeace through arms l i m i t a t i o n 
i s i l lu80ry» beoauae in our high technology, thpre w i l l 
be always s t r a t e g i c weapons of iiasa destruct ion* It i s 
a l s o suggested that armaments races msy be s u b s t i t u t e 
for s t r a t e g i c war* The spec ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s of nuclear 
dlsarmawsnt are real and they grow greater with every 
extension of nat ional atosiie indus tr i e s and research and 
with every increase in the quant i t i e s of f l s s i o n a b l s 
material that ex i s t* 
24* rCLD (Bernsrd T)* The t rouble with 9/ILT* !t«t. ffiw. of q r i . 
55 , 20? Nov. , 1972; 54-56 . 
The author oondludes that agreement y i e l d s advantagas to 
the Soviet Union im nonsense* Small numerical d i f ferences 
in s t r a t s g i e arms ars meaningless* Ths author rsmarks that 
SALT agreements of 1972 w i l l be another dsfsat for the 
atomic s c i e n t i s t s * The value of the agreements i s t o t a l l y 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t , i f and as long as they do not show a ser ious 
p o l i t i c a l w i l l t o stop of s t r a t e g i c armament* 
25 . FOSTER (u iUlams C). Lstter t o President Ford. Bull* of 
Peace Pro* 7, 21 1976? 105* 
The author expresses h i s concern over the manner in which 
the U.S* i s handling i t s arms control negot ia t ions and 
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agreements* In fact may be indirectly contrlbutlnq to 
the continuance and exoansion of the arms race* It is abnurd 
to dltorlmlnate between 'peaceful* and mllltsry nuclear 
explosion* 
26* FINE8CRG (Richard H*}* No wore chemical, biological war. 
New Rep. 167, 80; Dec, 1972; 17-19. 
The author sees that United States has halted development 
of biological weapons but research on defensive messurs 
continues* U*S*<fl* defence department officials have 
concluded that chemical and biological warfare poses no 
great strategic threat* The author remarks that U*S* 
chemical and biological warfare technology is far ahead 
of the soviet Union* There were some protests in 1952 
against the cruelty of the napalm bomb* 
27* FOSTER (ullHam C)* Strategic weapons, prosoects for 
arms control. For, fkfr* 47, 3? ftpr, l969j 413-421. 
The author concludes that there is a rough parity 
between the U*S* and the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear 
capability, and thus the prospects are as favourable as 
they are likely to be for mutual restrains in the arm 
race* The world Is at the threshold of a new round of 
nuclear weapons excalatlon technology* The ability to 
produce nuclear power has with it the ability to make 
nuclear weapons* 
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28. FOSTER (ul lHai i C)» Technological peace. Imp* of 5cl« 
on Society* 22 , 3j 1972: 235«38. 
The author concludes that appreciable progress has been 
made in the d i rec t ion of arms c o n t r o l . Though early 
attempts for complete disarmament f a i l e d l imited t e s t 
ban treaty and non-pro l i f erat ion treaty came in to 
e x i s t e n c e due t o super powers* The SALT negot iat ions are 
the key t o more universs l arms controls* 
29* CftLTUNG (3ohan)* The SALT armament agreement. Bull* of 
Pea. Pro. 3 , 4; 1972; 291-93. 
The author maintains that the *Wo8cow' arms control 
agreement i s neither a dissrmament agreement nor a 
agreement t o maintain the armament. I t oermits both s ides 
t o increase i t s mi l i t ary c a p a b i l i t i e s and arms competi-
t ion* Super powers are producing q u a l i t a t i v e arm race , 
e.g* e l e c t r o n i c warfare d e v i c e , l a s e r ueaoonary. 
30 . GARTHOTF (Douglas F ) . The Soviet mi l i tary and arms 
c o n t r o l . Survival* 19, 6 j Nov-Oec, 1977? 242-251. 
The author concludes that the Soviet mi l i tary has 
not i n i t i a t e d arms control measures. The m i l i t a r y ' s 
moderated 
natural conservatism regarding arms control may be / a s 
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i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for and s o e c l f l o I n t e r e s t s In apreements 
reachpd work t o Make arms control more an ordinary oart of 
i t s business* 
3 1 . GCLBER (Marry C). China and «5«LT. ^ r v l v a l . 12, 4; 
Apr, 1970J 122-126, 
The author concludes that the pos i t i on of China i s an 
important factor to judge a p o s s i b l e arm l i m i t a t i o n . 
China*s inf luence g ives more r e s u l t of d i scuss ion on 
l i m i t a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c weapons* China*s re la t ionship 
with the major powers indeed inf luence SftLT agreement* 
China's nuclear device poses a ser ious problem for 
European countries* 
32* GRAY (Colin S)* Detente , arms control and stratpgy 
perspect ive on S/ILT ftree* Pol* Sci* Rev* 70, 4: D e c , 
1976; 1242-1256. 
The author concludes that the experience of part ic ipat ing 
in SALT arms control nego t ia t ions s i n c e 1969 has led to 
ex tens ive debate and re- th inking among U*S* arms control 
s t r a t e g i s t s * In a l l current U*S* s t r a t e g i c debate, the 
greates t weakness i s lack of knowledge about Soviet 
s t r a t e g i c assumptions* 
33* GRIFFITHS (Franklyn)* Transnational p o l i t i c s and arms 
control* Inter* 3* 26 , 4; Sep, 1971; 640-647. 
The author concludes that arms control process has not 
y e t , a f fected the super power arms e f for t s* Small 
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countr ies nay exstt great Inf luence on world a f f a i r e by 
working toward* ideo log ica l changet and Canadians mioht 
inf luence world opinion i n favour of t ransnat ional 
co l labora t ion for arms l i n i t a t i o n * 
34« HI^ LLCTT (D )» Kissinger dolosust The domestic p o l i t i c s of 
S*«-T- Yale Rev. 65, 2J Dec, 1975; 161-174. 
The author concludes that the Nixon-Kissinger arms 
cont ro l po l icy has f a i l e d to cont ro l the develepnent of 
nuclear arsenals and has perhaps encouraged i t . Arms 
cont ro l negot iat ions are only one component of a broad 
ranged negot iat ions posture which i s d i rected at aeeking 
s t a b i l i t y i n i n te rna t iona l re la t ions rather than orogress 
on spec i f i c issue of content ion. 
35. HCURLIN <B}. Explaining SAiLTt Some observations on 
d i f f e ren t i n te rp re ta t i ons . Coop, and Conf. 12, 2 ; 1977? 
109-127. 
The author presents, discusses enti assesses some 
charac te r i s t i cs spproaches t o the study of SIRUT. The 
a r t i o l s concludes that studies dealing w i th SALT aa a 
p o l i t i c a l factor i n an in te rna t iona l context are needed. 
36. HOLUn (3ohn). The SftLT s s l l on who I w i l l be l t the 
Pentagon. The Nat ion. 222, 20? March, 1976? 326-28. 
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Th« author concludes that recent SALT II agreementt on 
l i m i t i n g the range of oruiee n i a e i l e s and back f i r e bombers 
i s meaningless* To stop the present expensive and 
dangerous arms racet U.S*A« should stop the t e s t i n g of 
new weapons* The purpose of t e s t i s t o make the nuclear 
weapons cheapert more e f f i c i e n t and more powerful. 
3 7 . HILL (3*t)* n i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l inf luences A case 
study of an arms embargo. Pac* Community. 6 , 3j Apr, 1975! 
407-420. 
The author concludes that arms embargo imposed by U.S. 
on Pakistan and India during and after the second Keahwir 
war (1965) provides i n s i g h t s in to the Influence of small 
powers in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with great powers* 
3 8 . IflBALANCE OF t e r r o r . S c i . Ame. 231 , 6j Dec, l974j 60-64. 
According to Stockholm Internat ional Peace Research 
I n s t i t u t e report* that prospects for any agreements between 
U*S. and U.S.S»R* concerning arms l i m i t a t i o n s are s l im . 
Such agreementa are a t ta inab le only when the two s ides 
achieved parity* The U*S*A* has increased depending on 
accuracy while U*S*S*R* has increased depending on 
m i s s i l e s * 
3 9 . DAIN (3*P). India and the sea-bed arms control t r e a t y . 
India Q* 3 0 , 4; Oct-Dec, l974f 300-313* 
The author concludes that India considered the Joint 
US-USSR draft sea-bed arms control t reaty and the ir 
Ti 
partial and llmitvd non<-arnanent meaturv and emphasized 
the need to safeguard coastal states which were neither 
nuclear ueapons powers nor had advanced under-sea 
technology* 
40. JOHANSfN (Robert C)» Ar«s control chicanery. yar» Pee, 
Rep* 13, 1J Sep, l975j 16-18* 
According to the author after the second world war, 
there have been continuous negotiations for arms control, 
which all fail*d» These efforts will continue to be failure 
as long as economic and political pressures for weaoons-
bullding continue* 
41* JOHNSTONE (Lcraig)* Ecocide and the Geneva protocol. 
For A>ff. 49, 4? July, 1971 j 7l1-72f5. 
The author concludes that Nixon administration has 
compiled an excellent record in limiting chemical and 
biological weapons, but the administration wishes to 
retain tsar gas and herbicides* There is little doubt 
that U*S. should ratify the protocol and prohibits the 
use in war of all gases and herbicides* 
42. KAPLAN (fred Pi). SALTt The end of arma control. 
Progressive* 42, 1; Jan., I978j 22-27. 
The author concludes that the strategic arms limitations 
talks have actually reinforced the escalating arms race. 
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Ai SALT failure night •ncourag* about other methods of 
controlling ariRt and re-examining the basic issues of 
defence policy* 
43. KLEIN (Herbert C). The meaning of nuclear arms limitation 
agreements* Asso. Wanao* 24, 10j July, 1972? 63-64. 
The author concludes that SI^ LT agreement that have been 
negotiated enable the United States to maintain its 
strategic position at minimum cost. If United States 
maintained its arms limitation, then it will be a 
significant slements in world peace. 
44. KLEIN (Peter). The United Nations and the problem of 
disarmament. German for. Policy. 9, 6j 1970; 475-80. 
The author concludes that United Nations has made positive 
contribution to arms limitation and disarmament in 1970 
when the balance of power shifts in favour of socialism, 
the United Nations must consolidate and extend the legal 
obligation for disarmament. General and complete dis-
armament will be carried out under effective international 
control. United Nations has always been in favour of 
establishing the necessary control over the observance and 
carrying out of disarmament measures. 
45. KQHLER (Gemot). Structural dynamic arms control. 3. of 
Pea. Wee. 14, 4j 1977? 315-326. 
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The author examines the Inves t iga t ion s t a r t s from the 
observatiion that in the f i e l d of arms control f a i lure ssems 
to be the rule and po in t s out that t h i s may be due to an 
empirical ly observable c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between lono-
term mi l i tary and economic grouth* 
46 . KRUZEL (Joseph). SALT III The search for a follow on 
agreement. Orbis. 17, 2J S e p . , 1973; 343-46. 
The author concludes that SAtLT agreement l i m i t s super 
powers t o the number of in tercont inenta l b a l l a s t i c m i s s i l e s 
and sub-marine - launched b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s . There were 
provis ion in the agreement which permits each s ide to 
replace old ICBI^ *s with new one. 
47 . LAWBETH (Benjamin S ) . The Soviet s t r a t e g i c chal lenge 
under S»tT I . Currsnt Hi s . 63 , 20; Oct, I97?j 150-53. 
The author examines that floseow agreement known as SAiLT I , 
were general ly approved by American, but s«ne object ions 
wsre a l so heard. One group holds the view that Sff^ LT I 
agreement g ive s much concession t o USSR. But i f we analyses 
the s i t u a t i o n U.S.Ak. has upper hands over Russia* 
48. LEflfftSiS (P.C). The SAtLT process and i t s use in regulating 
mobile lCBfl»s. Yale L.3 . 84 , 5j Apr., 1975? 1078-1082. 
The author concludes that the US and USSR in future SftLT 
agreements need t o encoapsss a var ie ty of sanctioning goa l s . 
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nslntsnance of world order through arms control reouires 
that a l l concarned s t a t s part ic ipata* Wobile ICBW dsoloyment 
would have several de lete i ' lous conseouences for world order 
and US should work wholeheartedly for a t o t a l ban. 
49. LENS (Sidney) . On SALT 2 . Progress ive . 42 , 4j Apr, 
1978; 28-3n. 
The author concludes that SALT II have greater supoert 
becauss Carter i s more favourable t o firms l imi ta t ion thsn 
Nixon or Tord. There are aomp s p e c i f i c l i m i t s on weepons. 
There were some r e s t r i c t i o n on mobile ICBW deployment. 
5 0 . LODGAARD ( S . ) . The f u n c t i o n s o f SALT. 3 . o f Pea Res. 
1 4 , 1J 19775 1 -22 . 
The author examines the e f f e c t s of SALT concerning, 
arms build up, s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y , c r i s i s s t a b i l i t y , 
r e l a t i o n of super oower, l eg i t imat ion of arms race. The 
super powtirs probably see a long term benef i t from ta lk ing 
t o each other t o promote common i n t e r e s t s under s h i f t i n g 
circumstances. 
5 1 . Lt3NG ( F A ) . Arms control from the perspect ive of the l9th 
century. Daedalus. in4 , 3 ; 3u ly , 1975; 1-13. 
The author concludes that of the many recant changes in 
emphasis and understanding of the subject of arms control 
there are at l e a s t half a dozen e x p l i c i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
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snd de ta i l ed ene lye l s* iKlthough a feu alffiole arms control 
measure can be discussed and negot iated In the absence of 
broader conelderat lone . 
52 . LONG (Franklin A). Should ue buy the Vladivostok agreement. 
Bull* of the frto» S o l e . 13, 5? Feb . , 1975? 5-6 , 
President Ford of the U»S. and President Breinev of U^ *»R 
reached an agreempnt in Wnv, 1974. The bealc aoreement 
that both countr ies should l imi t s t r a t e g i c d e l i v e r y . Hne 
of the cr i t i c iam of t h i s agreement i s that l i m i t s are so 
h igh. However, i t i s t o be hoped that the establishment 
of some l i m i t s y i l l make i t eas i er t o work for re s t r i c t ions* 
5 3 . MARTIN (3oseph). Statement at the conference of the 
committee on disarmament. B u l l , of Pea. Pro. 29, 131 fiior, 
1075; 218-219. 
Conventional arms have a central p lace in the mi l i tary 
planning. Restrains on such weapons would therefore be 
important. It would be useful t o consider t h i s in a 
regional contex t . Outside powers should support and 
resoect any regional agreements achieved. However world 
wide agreements would a l s o be useful regarding arms 
t r a n s f e r s . Restra ints might a l so apply to dcmestic arms 
production and transfer of technology* 
54 . MCKNIGHT (Allan D ) . ft French love a f fa ir with atom. 
Atust. Q. 44 , 20; Sep, 1972; 10-13. 
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Th« author eoneludtt that recant tuggeatlona of 
French eot^aration with Auatralia In a Joint uranium 
enrichment programme demanda a cleae aorutiny* The 
continuing deaire of the Auatralian government to 
manufacture nuclear weapons and the wlllingneaa of the 
French to participate in it* The author remarka that 
it would be worst poaalble nuclear policy for Australia 
to become a Junior partner of France* 
55* nURPHY (Charles 3*V*}* What we gave away in the noaeew 
arma agreementa. Fortune* 86, 40; Sep* 1972? 110-13. 
The author concludea that in the atrategio arma limita-
tion talka the intereat of U*5*A* haa been put aaide* 
Russia has lead in offensive weapona* The U*S*A. was 
neither developing nor deploying any new weapons* The 
author further remarka that it is important for national 
secutity that American Reaearch and Development effort 
should be strengthened* 
56. PALMER (Wichael)* Arms control and the mediterranean. 
Uorld Today* 27, lOj Nov, 1971J 495-97* 
The author concludea that arms control agreement limiting 
US and Soviet naval presence in the mediterranean must 
satisfy the principles relating to restriction of force 
and verification* Theae principlea have been recognized 
in paat arms limitation agreements like non-proliferation 
treaty, and the limited test ban treaty* 
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57. PANOFSKY (Uolfgkang K.H.). A different oertpectlve 
on SAiLT I. Bull, of Pea. Pro> 7, 2J 1976j 117. 
The author eoncludea that SALT I Treaty provided for 
the establlahnent of a atandin^ conaultatlve conmiaalon. 
The SDbLT agreement waa failed to reatrain arma eaoalation. 
By examining the development of SI^LJ negotlationat that 
the U.S.A* le not primarily conceived ulth the relaxation 
of teneion or ceaaatlon of the arm race. 
58. PAOLUCCI (Dominie A). The realitlee of arma Ilmltatlona* 
U.S. Naval Ina. Pro. 98, 5; Way, 1972; 178-80. 
The author concludes that arma control may not reduce 
the word tensions but In fact cause higher coats and 
Inoreaae tension. Arms control negotiations are seen 
to use various means whereby a country can gain an 
advantage over another. 
59. PEKING AND srma control. Current See. 19, 8| Aug. 7, 
I971t 11-12. 
China continuea to denounce partial steps towards arms 
control, which it contends aim at maintaining super-power 
monopoly of nuclear power and world domination. China 
calls for a summit conference of all nations to discuaa 
prohibition and deatruetion of all nuclear weapons. 
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60. PICRRE (A»J»)« Limiting Soviet and American conventional 
forces. Survival. 15, 2j War-Apr, 1973? 59-64. 
The author examinee that manpower and conventional 
ueapone of United States and Soviet Union, esoecially 
of the cost of defence, mutual reductions of budgets, 
mutual reductions of forces, make clear that limitations 
of manpower and weapons are more feasible than limitations 
on defence weapons. 
61. PRIWAKOV (c.W*). Problems of ending the arms race and 
eliminating the danger of nuclear war. Bull, of Pea. Pro. 
7, 2; 1976J 114. 
The author concludes that every eight hours, in U.S. 
a new nuclear warhead is produced. In field of strategic 
armaments most sophisticated and costly research is being 
carried out. It is clear that for disarmament policy is 
necessary to adopt effective measure to limit all arm 
race. 
62. RATH3ENS (George u ) . A breakthrough In arms control. 
Sci . and Pub. <lff. 27, 6; 3une» 1971; 4-5. 
The author concludes that Soviet delegates to SALT tabled 
a draft treaty to l imit ASn systems but the U.S. rejected 
the offer. The author bel ieves that H^SW agreement i s very 
important and such agreement could give security to both 
s ides . 
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6 3 . QUesTCR (Georg* H). Sows conceptual problems in nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n . ft»e» P o l . Sei» Rev. 66 , 2? 3une, 1972j 
490-93* 
The author ueee graphic meane to represent d i f ferent 
answers t o the question that how far i s a given s t a t e s 
from aeguirlng ouclear weapons, t f we ask how far 3aDan 
I s from the bcMibt we might get Brr est imate of three years . 
64 . ROBINSON ( c h r i s ) . U.S . undermines gas war ban. Recon. 
3 , 2J reb , 19751 6-10 . 
After almost SO y e a r s , the U.S. has agreed t o s ign the 
1925 Geneva protocol which prohib i t s chemical and b io log ica l 
warfare. Vietnam was proof where h e r b i c i d e s , tear gas were 
used. The U.S. i s , however, not prepared to l e t the 
protocol stand as i t i s . The other nat ions who have 
signed have agreed t o a t o t a l ban on chemical and b i o -
l o g i c a l warfare* 
65 . ROBINSON ( 3 . P ) . Controls on CU research and development. 
PuQ. News le t ter . 13, i ; Duly, 1975; 38 . 
Uays and means for reducing in ternat iona l mistrust in cy 
matters must be found i f the par t i e s t o a Clf convention 
are t o have the confidence neoesssry both t o negot ia te 
and to observe i t . There should be control in chemical 
weapons. Tor t h i s purpose the super*pouers should contact 
each other and report them the achieving in chemical wea-
pons. 
0 1 
66. ROSC (Oavid 3)* Nuclear pouer* nuclear weapons and 
International atabi l l ty* Sele^ ftwe* 238, 4; Aipr, 1978? 
45-48. 
The author concludes that Irresolution over demestic 
energy policy and the role of nuclear pouer may act to 
undernine current US efforts to control the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons* 
67* SALOnON (nichael O). New concepts for strategic parity* 
Survival. 19, 6j Nov-Dec, 1977| 255-262. 
The author concludes that the changes in the strategic 
balance, the increased military effectiveness of the 
strategic weapons deployed or under development and 
emphasis on counter force thinking have implications far 
beyond their immediate effeete* 
68. SCHELLING (TC). * frame work for the evaluation of arms 
control proposals. Daedalus* 104, 3? 3unet 1975? 187-200. 
The author concludes that arms control bargaining la often 
about binary decisions to have or not to have some weapons. 
Even when a government wants the other government not to 
have some weapons, i t s motivation can be of several 
alternative kinds. It may i t s e l f prefer to have the 
weapon, whether or not the other side has i t . 
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69. SCOVILLE (Herbert), The SALT negotiations. Sole. Awe. 
237, 2? Aug, I977j 24-31. 
The author concludes that current strategic arms 
limitation talks can put a real ceiling on the Quantita-
tive arms race and restrain the qualitative race. A 
failure to do so may destabilize the present strategic 
balance* 
70. SCOVILLE (Herbert 3). SRLTt Taking up a Soviet offer. 
Bull, of Pea. Pro. 7, 2? 1976; 106. 
The author concludes that the only ar^a in which SALT 
has any chance of promoting restraint is the cruise 
missiles. The Soviet has proposed that all long-range 
aea-launched cruise missile should be banned» but U.S.A* 
government is not taking seriously these prooosals. 
71. SHESTOV (U). Pravada on SALT. Survival. 13, 4? Apr, l97it 
123-126. 
The author attacks on American unwillingness to reach 
agreement in the strategic arms limitation talks on Soviet 
terms. American bases in western Europe give a military 
advantage which is unacceotable in a strategic arms 
agreement. 
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72. SMART ( Ian) . The s t r a t e g i c arms l i w i t a t i o n t a l k s . The 
world Today. 26, 7j 3u ly , 1970? 296-305. 
The author est imates that there i s at l e a s t 20,000 
nuclear weapons in the world. Almost a l l of t h i s destruc-
t i v e power i s in the hands of the two super powers. By 
1975 the USSR w i l l have more than 15,000 separate 
s t r a t e g i c nuclear weapons. SA^ CT has brought U.S.ft. and 
the USSR t o l imi t s t r a t e g i c armaments* Soth countries are 
under extreme economic pressure , because of the cost of 
the arms race . 
73 . STEPHOIS (Robert) . The SftLT on the nucl ear t a i l s . 
Observer. 10, 45; Hey 28 , 1972; 6 . 
The author concludes that main agreements between USA 
and the USSR i s t o l i m i t t h e i r s t r a t e g i c nuclear weapons* 
This agreements s a t i s f i e s the American concept of 
• suf f ic iency* and the Soviet aim of 'par i ty* . But the 
agreement does l i m i t the weapons that each s ide might have 
acquired over the next ten years i f the Vladivostok 
agreement had not been made* 
74 . SULLIVAiN (Wichael 3 ) . Conference at cross roadt Future 
prospects for the conference of the committee on d i s -
armament • Inter .Pro . Sep, 1975; 394-413. 
A 26 member committee chaired by USA and USSR discussed 
two i s s u e s which not agreed by super-power. The i ssue 
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U88 ban of chemical weapons and nuclear tes t ing* 
In recent years a Movement has been I n i t i a t e d by non-
al l igned s t a t e s t o e s t ab l i sh s new forum the world 
disarmament conference* 
75* THE ARWS race ins t i tu t iona l lxed* Seie . ftme* ?3?, 3? 
March, 1975? 47* 
At the Vladivostok t s l k s , the understanding reached 
which i s serving ss a bas i s for SALT ITI set an uooer 
l imi t of ?,4'7n on the t o t a l number of long-range 
del ivery vehicles and each side may not eouip more than 
1|320 of i t s miss i les with mult iple independently tflroet-
able re -en t ry vehicles* These ce i l ing are subs tan t ia l ly 
higher than the present s t r a t e g i c arsenal of e i ther s ide . 
76* THE GENEVA protocol accented* Sole* ftme* 232, 3 : f^srch, 
1975; 47-48* 
In January 1975, U.S#A* and U.S.*^."* banned the 
production and possession of bac te r io log ica l and toxin 
weapons* U*S*M* maintained tha t r i o t gas and herbic idles 
are not chemical warfare* /Rs now, there i s no orohibi t ion 
on production or s tock-p i l ing of chemical wesoons or nerve 
cas* U«S»S*R* and 3apan made Joint proposal to ban the 
production and t r ans fe r of a l l chemical weapons* The 
American pos i t ion on binary gases , r i o t gas and herbicides 
i s ambiguous* 
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77. THE NOT-so-burning oupst lon . CUB. Uepk* ^en. 19, i974: 
2 1 , 
Th08« using napalm or phosohorua, are responalble for 
extremp and prolonged suffer ing and v i o l a t i n g the 
p r i n c i p l e s of Just war doctr ine . There have been i n t e r -
national e f f o r t s t o ban them. Hany nat ions have 
responded t o c a l l from U.N. Assembly to ban them but 
great powers have expressed r e s e r v a t i o n s . 
78. THE SALT agreement. Inter.Def«f?>v« 5, ?J Aug, l97?r 
357. 
The author concludes that population of D.^.A. and 
Russia i s h o s t i l e t o nuclear weapons. The ^»i bomber 
and t r ident m i s s i l e were used as bargaining counters 
in the negot ia t ion of the agreements. The *iftLT aoreement 
between U.S. and U.S.S.R. i s p o l i t i c a l l y ingenioust but It 
does r e a l l y so lve the s t r a t e g i c problems of the mi l i tary 
planners of those countries* 
7 9 . THE SALT-FREE weapons. S c i e . AWy* 2 3 2 , 5 : Way, 1975: 4 7 - 4 3 . 
The s t r sks^ ie arms l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s ignore t a c t i c a l i . e . 
short-range nuclear waaoons though U.S.A. and Russia have 
huge s tocks of them, both at sea and in Europe. The 
Amerleen centre for Defence information urges a debate 
about them. The land based m i s s i l e s in part icular increase 
the r i sk of t h e f t , terrorism and acc ident s , snti endanger 
the countr ies in which they sre deployed. 
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80» THCe (riarek). Arms c o n t r o l , 3 . of Pea>Re8« 14, 2f 
1977; 95-99. 
The author concludes that arms control as implemented 
In recent years and r e f l e c t e d in a number of mul t i l a tera l 
and b i a l a t e r a l U .S . -Sov ie t accords has not halted the arms 
race. Rsosntly SHlLT-2 agreement i s allowed that there i s 
no l imi t on the number of nuclear warheads* How can the 
super-powers exoset other nations to forego nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n , i f super-powers themaelves continue to 
emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons in t h i s way* 
81 . THEt (f*'8rek). Cr i s i s in arms contro l . B u l l , of Pee«Pro» 
7, 2 ; 1976; 99-110. 
The author examines that arms control i s in serious 
t rouble , arms race continues to ao ira l upwa rds , arms 
control has not been able to keep pace with raoid techno-
l o g i c a l development and mi l i tary eouivplence i s vague and 
ambiguous and making i t impossible t o measure and e f f o r t s 
in the d i rec t i on of e q u a l i t y . 
82 . TOWLIN ( I ) . Chemical weapons must be outlawed* Inter*>ff« 
3une, 1972; 8-12. 
The author concludes that Soviet Union and other s o c i a l i s t 
countr ies submitted a draft t o U*N* disarmament committee 
on baning of chemical weapons* The 1925 Ceneva orotocol 
prohib i t s the use of chimical weapons* The nations of the 
60 
world approved the d r a f t of ban . The t h e a l a t ha t nuclp^r 
arms under a l l c o n d i t i o n s guaran tee p o l i t i c a l dependence 
and s e c u r i t y ha t not been oroven as t r u e In I t s oenera l 
context* 
8 3 . UNLOVED TREATY. N a t u r e . 2 5 4 , 1^7; Warch 13 , 1<575: ^ 1 . 
In t h i s a r t i c l e the p o s i t i o n of N o n - P r o l l f e r a t i o n Treaty 
(NPT) has been d i s c u s s e d . I t I s widely be l ieved t h a t 
MPT con ta in s assurances t o non-nuclear s t a t p s in thp 
even of nuc lea r a t t a c k s . Rut t h i s I s not the o o s l t i o n , 
no one have t h e courage t o suggest t h a t t h e t r e a t y should 
be abo l i shed and neu approach should be t r i e d . 
84 . yOCHELSON (3ohn) . WBTRj The search for an ffmrrican 
approach. Hrb l s . 17, i ; <5eo, 1<=»73j 15^-57, 
The author concludes t h a t mutual f^r\d ba lanced force 
r e d u c t i o n s has been used for d i s cus s ion between western 
and e a s t e r n Europe and between U . ^ . ^ . and Russ ia , '"^ro 
can be success fu l I f *iOviet Union and U.'^.ffi. withdraw 
t h e i r fo rces from Europe. 
8 5 . YORK (Herbert E ) . ffi l i t t l e arms c o n t r o l can be danoerous 
t h i n g . Uar and Pea. Reo. 7 , 7 ; aug-^pp, 1^71: 3 -7 , 
The author believes tha t general and comolpte dlsptmament 
muat be our f inal qoa l . He br ief ly tpvleus the his tory of 
arm racef of arms control and diearfnament neqot la t iona. 
The SWLT t a l k s are quite l imited in scooe. The t a lks u l l l 
concern s t r a t e q i c offensive and defensive systamsf whosp 
develoqments In ouantlty and ouall ty u l l l oerhaos makp 
agreeinents d i f f i cu l t or Imoossible. 
86. MHAT THE Treaty ul th Russia does to l),«=!. defences. 
U.S. Neus and Uorld Reo* T5, 30; Oct. 7, 1^7?: •^7-^1. 
The author concludes the Imoact of the anti-hall t«»ttc 
miss i le t r e a ty on fj.??. plans for miss i l e defence. Thnuoh 
the t r e a ty allows the construction of two ffRf s i t e , but 
U«*?.A» i s golnq ahead with only one* The theme of the 
t rea ty i s the s t r a t e q l c t e l a t innsh lo between the two 
coun t r i e s . The centra l task of the neoot la t inns consis ts 
of es tabl ish ino a standard measurino stock for the 
evaluation of in tent ions of the lAdversarles* 
87. UOLFF (Thwnas) The Soviet Union Bnd «;^ 'LT. The nor Id Today 
27, 4; ftpr, 1971J 162-74. 
Aiccording to author af ter the second SAdJ conference,there 
l i t t l e progress was made towards a possible agreempnt on 
the s t r a t e g i c arms compptltion between the «5oviet Union and 
United S t a t e s . The slow down in economic performance durinq 
1968-69 supports the idea tha t Soviet Union economy i s 
hurting from large mi l i t a ry programmes of the l a s t few 
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years . Prpviousl planned investment for lono-term economic 
growth in both non-defence industry and agriculture l lkeulsp . 
ftRWS FRECZE 
88. LFDERBERG (Joshua). A freeze on m i s s i l e t e s t i n o . «^ci. and 
Pub, ftff. 27 , 3? Warch, 1971? 4-6 , 
The author concludes that a comprehensive freeze on e l l 
m i s s i l e t e s t s would be most e a s i l y v e r i f i e d and would 
provide the utmost assurance against the perpetuation of a 
c o s t l y t echnolog ica l race . The author does not be l i eve that 
world i s ready for general anc complete disarmament. 
PRI«f5 REDUCTION 
89. RORNftBY ( F ) . Can nuclear-weapon p r o l i f e r a t i o n be orpvented. 
Bu l l , of Pea. Pro. 8, 1; 1977; 7-14. 
The author concludes that precious l i t t l e time remains to 
halt nuclesr-weaoon o r o l i f e r a t l o n in a world only recently 
ser ious ly concerned sbout the spresd of the caoabi l i ty to 
produce f i s s i o n a b l e mater ia l s s u i t a b l e for mi l i tary use 
through the spread of nuclear technolooy for peaceful 
purpose. 
90. BfltUGH (W.H). Rrms reduction p o s s i b i l i t i e s for SALT IT 
negot ia t ions and beyond. Ame. 3 . of Pol . S e i . 7^, 1; 
Feb . , 1975; 67-95 . 
The author concludes that secur i ty l e v e l s ere studied 
under several a l t e r n a t i v e s for the ouant i ta t lve reduction 
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of s t r a t e g i c ariita including e l l n l n a t l o n of land 
baaed wiaa i lea and racuction of tha Valdlvoatok c a l l l n o 
quanti t laa on nimbem of wiaa i l e s* Hne can aaaily 
aorove tha idaa of WBfR fmutual balancari forca reduction^ 
in ruroopt ainca thp ueaoona ayatawa faelno aacH othpr. 
91 , RrLLSHY f l m ) * Tha oroblam of balanoinej raductiona in 
convantlonal forcaa. J» of Conf* Wea» 17^ A? Hec, 1'^7'i: 
657-58. 
Tha author axanJinaa tha problam that how can raduca 
tha foroa atrength on aach aida without dlaturbino tha 
belanca of power* The concluaion reached that equal or 
oloae t o equal and peroantaga raduetlon ia tha beat 
c r i t e r i a for maintaining a t a b l l l t y * Howewerf tha moat 
that w i l l actual ly happen ia a I^ BC reduction in troooa; 
th ia 10^ i a in excaaa of e t r e t e g l c naeda in any caaat 
and the coats of Maintaining ia r i s i n g rapidly* 
92. BCTTR*n (Chriatoph). The p o l i t i c s of nBFR. Tha world 
Today. 29 , 1? 3an, 1973t 1-7. 
The author ooncludaa that t r a d i t i o n a l aporoach to arma 
control t o reduce the dangara of a mi l i tary confronta-
t i o n between the two powers i s l arge ly irre levant* Tha 
pr ino ioa l factor in detariaining Curopean securi ty i a not 
confrontat ion a i t u e t i o n between East and Ueat but the 
threat of Soviet aggress ion . 
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93. CftNBY (Steven L). Mutual force reductlonst A military 
perepective. Inter. Security. 2, 3; DeCf 1978? 122-135. 
In this essay the author argues that any advantage to 
NATO from force reductions, given NAT0*8 military 
structure and deployment! would have to accuse from much 
larger reductions than have so far been proposed. It 
must be noted that the Uarsau Pact countries are not 
interested in reductions. The concern about Soviet 
military might - increased by U.S. troops reductions, 
Soviet "f ritime expansion, ueet European doubts about 
being able to increase their own dafenee efforts* 
94. OAVINIC (Prvoslav). Standstill in weapon control talks. 
Rev* of Inter. /V.ff. 25, 577; Sep, 1974; 20-21. 
The force reduction negotiations between NA\Tn and 
Warsaw Pact in Vienna have some difficulties* NATO 
insists on balanced force reduction and first phase 
restricted to ground forces and armaments of U.*i.A. and 
U.S.S.R. in central Europe. But on the other hand 
Warsaw Pact wants reductions of troops including land 
and air forces of 11 countries. 
95. KOSTKO (Yuri), military detente in Purooet concepts 
and problems. Ins. Res, on Pea* and \tio» 7, 1; 1977; 
11-25. 
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The author concludes thet the Socialist policy of 
military detente in Europe* and esoeclally the reduction 
of armed forces in central E!urope» is based on the 
principles of collective security* Political detente 
can encourage reduction of armed forces* Some steos that 
western nations could take* without jeoosrdizing their 
security that could open up the way for disarmament 
race and would test the will for reel detente. 
96. LENS (Sidney). Perspective* Progressive* 42, 1; 3an, 
1978; 12-13. 
The author examines that proliferation would result In 
global instability* Both the arms race and Incrpaslng 
dependence on nuclear oouer have ensured the accuracy 
of the prediction* U*S* administration has attemot»d to 
control proliferation by rejecting funds for reactors 
and restrictions on nations receiving American aid. 
97. miLSTeiN (n). Wilitary detente and scientific technical 
cooperation* Pup* News Letter. 13, 1; Duly, 1975; 23. 
This article attempts to answer two questions, whet 
impedes effective military detente in Europe and how 
could military detente facilitate cooperation of 
European countries in Science, Technology and Culture. 
Besides many developments in European political coooera-
tion the slow pace of the Vienna talks on the reduction 
BQ 
of armed forces and arm^ent In central Europe g ives 
r i s e to neu problem that i s mi l i tary detente In Europe* 
98. NUCIBVR AND conventional armaments must be reduced 
s imultaneously . Peking Rev. 21 , 25; June 23 , 1978; 
27-29 . 
This a r t i c l e from Chinese presentfitlon at U.N. i^ssembly 
on disarmament shous that two super-powers have 
constant ly added t o t h e i r weaoonary while talking 
disarmament. China says that both conventional and 
nuclear armaments must be reduced together to svoid 
increased danger of war. The western powers concentrated 
on Major i s sues? who should reduce force f i r s t , and the 
large number of troops and armament in Furope i s at odds 
with the changed p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . 
99, SAtNDSTROT! (ft). MBFR: W non-starter or a slow s t a r t e r . 
coop, and Conf. 11 , 2 ; 1976; 71-94. 
The author concludes that East-Uest dialogue which 
s tarted in Vienna more than 3 years ago to discuss the 
reduction of forces in centra l Europe has produced no 
agreement so far . The i n i t i a l proposals of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact were the r e s u l t of considerable p o l i t i c a l 
and mi l i tary caut ion. f^ BFR of fers the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
making the raporoachment between East and West concretely 
v i s i b l e and t e s tab le* 
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100, 5T»NLrY (Timothy u ) . Mutual force reduct ion. 
Survival . 12, 5? Way, 1970? 152-60, 
In t h i s a r t i c l e the author g ive s an example of a 
mutual force reduction plan* His plan has many 
phases . W minor reduction of U.S. force in furooe, 
reduction of 10^ of ground forces of the Warsaw-Pact 
troops in East Germany, Poland, and an additional 
15^ reduction of a l l a c t i v e ground forces in a l l 
countr ies of the Uersaw Pact and the NJITO. 
101. SUT£R (K.D.) . The 1975 review conference of nuclear 
non-pro l i ferat ion t r e a t y , flust. Outlook. 30 , ?; lup, 
1976? 322-34. 
The author examines that the f i r s t review 
conference of 1968 nuclrar non-prol i ferat ion 
treaty took place in 1975. It was preceded by 
four major developments. India 's Way, 1974 exolosion 
of nuclear dev ice , the internat ional concern over the 
energy c r i s i s , the growing threat of nuclear terrorism 
by g u e r r i l l a s , and the f a i l u r e of U.S. and Soviet 
Union t o carry out t h e i r NPT obl igat ion to negot iate 
a disarmament. 
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BAN OF NUCLTAR UCAPONS ON OCFAN TLOOR 
102. YOUNG ( E l i i a b e t h ) . To guard the s ea . ror*)lff. 
50 , It Oct, I97 l ; 136-147. 
The author concludes that negot ia t ions for a m s 
control beneath the sea are unique In character . 
S t r a t e g i c w i s a l l e s located under water would 
probably be safer than tops ide weapone* Sea bed 
l i m i t a t i o n s nay ooiie about because of the develoiMent 
of conservation and antl->pollution regulat ions snd t h s i r 
enforcement. The main e f f e c t of the t reaty l i e s in 
improving the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere. 
BAN ON use or NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
103. ULLMAN (Richard H»). No f i r s t use of nuclear weapons. 
For. Aff. 50 , A; 3u ly , 1972? 669-683. 
The author concludes that s ince i t s admission to 
the United N s t i o n s , China has been urging the United 
S t a t e s and Soviet Union t o Join i t in a pledge against 
the f i r s t use of atomic wsapons* U.S.A. and Russis 
have been ambiguous about the i r nuclear i n t e n t i o n s . 
eg 
DCTr^Tin^t pirTMnn - i}MnrRn'=?nUMri 
105. LONG (Gh ayvs * ) • f r ea ty on t h t l i m i t a t i o n of undtr-
ground nuclpar uaapont t v s t t . Bull» of ftto» Scle> 1^, 
5t 3 a n . , 1975; 16-17. 
ht the noseow aimmit npetlng of 1974» U.S.A. and 
U.S.S.R. propoaed a new agreement to l i m i t underground 
test ing of nuclear weapons. There was further proposals 
to use nuclear explosions for peaceful purpose. The 
aiithDr sees these proposals as backward step because 
m i l i t a r y gains from t h i s tes t ing w i l l be i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
106. STRATEGIC GEOWETRY. New Soc. 28 , 606? Way, l974j 
336. 
The author stressss the need of complete ban on 
tes t ing nuclear weapons which were considered by 
Russia and U.S.A. Howevert the b i -po le r world 
concept i s considered outdated. Geo-strategy have 
been replaced by s t ra teg ic geometryt the l a tes t 
concspt i s a hexagonal world control led by USAf Russia, 
China, CCC, and Arab Petroleum exporting countr ies. 
0i5ftRffffti»!rNT - crwrRffiL ' " 
107. A CHANCE to speak for survival. Proorsssivs* 42, 6? 
3une, 1978J 6-7. 
The United Nations special session on dlsarmafRent 
is the first such universal effort since early I96^s. 
Oenonatrations throughout the United States, Daoan, 
Uestern Curope against nuclear race* Disermanent 
especially nuclear is essential to avoid a world 
holocaust. But there has no progress on dissriRsment 
and arm race has not been stopped. 
108. ARREl (Ian). A neu Csnsdian policy for defence* 
Uorld Fed. 19, 114j 3sn, 1974T 10*11. 
The author concludes that Canada should disarm 
completely and get out of the NATO. He further 
argues that Canada should continue its arms commitment 
to U.N. Peace Keeping forces* He further examines 
that if government truly uant to liberate their 
citizens from the menace of war three things become 
necessary. (l) Stopping the fabrication of all arms 
(?) destroying those weapons which exist and f3) re-
converting the induatrisl sector to a pesee-time 
economy without creating unemployment. 
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109. CHCNG (Huan). China's wavering line* Far* Cae« Ceo. 
Rev. 78, 49l Dee. 2, 1972? 26-27. 
The author concludes that China is opDOsed to any 
disarnanent conference convened by the U.S. or the 
U.S.S.R. unless it ains at total disarnaRient, 
destruction of all nuclear weapons and withdrawal of 
all troths from foreign soil. 
110. COOK (David T.) Arms reaeareher sees hard road to 
peace. Christian Sci. Won. 15, 5; Oct. 16, i975j 20. 
U.S. congressnan Les nspin says that U.S. arms sales 
abroad in the last 2 years have been ? 20.3 billion. 
The author indicates that today world spend more than 
S 210 billion on arms, wider spread of sophisticated 
weapons and increasing militarixation of third world 
countries. But there are obstacles to either total or 
nuclear disarmament includes domestic pressures for 
disarmaments mould probably require drastic action. 
111. CURNC^ (R). General and complete disarmament a system 
analysis approach, futures, i, 5? Oct, I976j 384-396. 
The author proposes a two-phased approach to the etudy 
of general and complete disarmament, a synthesis of past 
research to portray the social role of armament. The 
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author i s awar* of th« liiaitationa of tysteM analysis 
and stress ths nsed to involvs a wids audience in the 
evaluation of the results* 
112 . DISARMAWrNT. U»W> Won*Chro. 7 , 1 1 : Dec , 1970? 4 7 - 5 ? . 
Ait 21 meetings, the f i r s t oomtnlttee considered the 
seven disarmament items on i t s agenda* The felloL'ina 
items were considered under the general disarmament, 
question of general and complete disarmament, Question 
of ehesteal and bacteriological weapons and urgent n^wd 
for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear t e s t s . 
113* DISAR«*WENT. U.N. Won.Chro* 9 , 1 ; Dan, 1972; 1 1 5 - 2 1 . 
The general assembly on 16 December, 1972 on the 
reeommendation of i t s f i r s t committes adopted 13 
resolutions in connection with disarmament. These 
resolutions concerned with complete disarmament. 
General Assembly urged a l l states on the complete 
prohibition of the develt^xosnt, production and 
stock-pil ing of ehemicsl wsspons* 
114. DlSA'^WA»»fNT. U.N. Wen. Chro. 1 0 , 9 ; O c t . , 1973? 
4 4 , 4 7 , 5 1 . 
The general debate of 28th session of the U.N. General 
Assembly wss marked by powerful attacks on the expendi-
7;] 
tur« for arns instsad of fot development there were 
deManda for general and complete diaarmamentt nuclear 
dlsarmtfRent and varioua degreea of diaarmament* Completi 
dlaarmament will be feasible only in the event of 
radical changea in the world political environment* Thit 
muat Involve a reduction in economic disparltiea* 
115. DI5ARWAWENT. U.N. Won. Chro. 10, 10; Nov, 1973? 
88.90, 97-9B. 
During the general debate of ?8th aeaslon of the U.N. 
General Assembly many speakers spoke on the disarmament. 
All urged for an immediate reduction of 10^ on armament 
spending, nost of the speakers at this session were 
representatives of less industrialized and poorer 
nations advocated that funds could be diverted from 
such uaateful expenditure to the development of 
resources. 
116. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. U.N. Won. Chro. 20, 12; May, 
1975? 12-13. 
The success and practical results of the world dis-
armament conference depend on the participation of all 
nuclear powers. For this purpose 40 nations who do not 
possess nuclear arms called a conference. The main 
objectives was, sevpral and eomplpte disarmament which 
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yould involve t o t a l banning of nuclear t e a t s t 
des truct ion of nuclear stock p i l e s and uithdrawal of 
a l l foreign troops* 
117, DISARnARENT FAlLURC. Progressive. 42 , 8 j Aug., I978f 
9 , 
The United Nations spec ia l s e s s ion on disarmament 
MRS I n i t i a t e d by third world nat ions and received 
only token support from i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nations* I t s 
e f f e c t i v e implementation requires a profound analys i s 
and understanding of p o l i t i c a l t economic and soc ia l 
paramounts in a world when such disarmament would be 
poss ib le* 
118. TEO 005YCV (v)* Disarmament, order of the day* Inter* 
ftff. 3 a n . , 19721 103-104. 
The authors reports on the meeting of the world oeace 
counci l on disarmament in notoow on October 30-31» 1971, 
which dea l t with the problems of l i m i t a t i o n s of the arm 
raee» the socio-economic e f f e c t s of disarmament, end the 
connection between disarmament and the environmental 
problems* 
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119. CABtLIC (Andro). Uhst t o expect from SMLT t a l k s . 
Wcv* of Intgy* hrf> 2 3 , 522; 3an. 5 , 1972? 6 -8 . 
In the author's opinion t h t armaments race u l l l be 
continued even af ter the U«S«>Sovlet agreement* The 
author a l s o shows how there i s l i t t l e eoullibrlum 
between U»S* and Soviet o f f ens ive systems* Complete 
nuclear disarmaments under present Internat ional 
condi t ions can only be achieved through p o s s i b l e steps* 
120* GARTHOfF (f?L). S«LT and the Soviet mi l i tary* Prob* 
of Cowm. 24 , 1? Jan-Feb, 1975; 21-37* 
The author concludes that Soviet o b j e c t i v e s in the 
SALT negot ia t ions have been complex* The most funda-
mental p o l i t i c a l ob jec t ive has been H^meriean recognit ion 
of par i ty of the USSW with USA, s p e l l i n g the end of the 
USSR's i n f e r i o r i t y in i t s r e l a t i o n s with US. But 
pressure of en economic has been a l s o an important 
considerat ion in encouraging Soviet i n t e r e s t in SALT* 
121. CFYFR (Alan)* C r i t i c a l i s s u e for l978t The disarmament 
debate* Chris* and C r i s i s * 37 , 22? 3an*, 1978; 322-325. 
The author concludes that 1978 may be the most 
momentous year for disarmament s i n c e 1945, because 
the peaca t a l k s between U*5* and the U*S*S*R*, rapid 
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growth of in tarnat ions l nuclear trade* and U.N* aoecial 
•esa lon on disarmament* The ser ious cofflmitnent of the 
Carter administration to arms c o n t r o l , e s o e c i a l l y nuolef*r 
arms; a good orospect of SftLT II agreement* 
122* GEYER (Alan). Disarmament! A los ing cause In nemd of 
rescue* Chris , and C r i s i s . 38 , 7f Way 15, 1978? 114-117. 
The author concludes that most ^ e r l e a n s do not even 
know about the tJ*!4* Specia l Session on disarmament* 
Neither government nor the media havo publ ic ized 
information about i t * Even churches and cHurch 
assemblies have not made disarmament a high ur ior i ty* 
123* KALYAOlN (n)* The s trugg le for disarmsment. Ins . ^es* 
Pea. Vio . 5 , 1? 1975? 24-34 . 
The author concludes that the only way t o Imolement 
disarmament in a world s p l i t in to two opoosing soc ia l 
systems i s thftouQh the affirmation of the bas ic norm of 
peaceful co -ex i s tenoe in r e l a t i o n s betwsen s t a t e s with 
d i f f erent s o c i a l systems* 
124. KlNTNEf! (William R)snd PrAL Tl G^Afr (Robert L). 
Assessing the Moscow SAiLT agreements. Oybis* 16, 2; 
Sept , 1972? 341-43. 
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The author raises aupstlons on agreefflsnt on offensive 
missi les between US/^  and US^R* The arms agreement may 
provide a greater measure of security i f U*S« maintains 
a strong research and development programme* 
125. KORHONPN ( K ) . Disarmament ta lks as an instrument of 
in te rna t iona l p o l i t i c s * goop* and Conf*5t 3 j l97nt 
152-170. 
The author conoludea that many p o l i t i c a l side ef fects 
of AC D* (*rms control and disarmament) ta lks seem to 
flow merely from the fact that t a l k s are taking place. 
The s ide -e f fec ts are probably aggravated by the 
f rus t ra t ing proceedings of «C0 ta lks and by the abaence 
of concrete resul ts in moat f a t e f u l areas. There were 
numerous demands for act ion on disarmament* The 
problem of disarmament should be given p r i o r i t y over 
other problems confronting the world today. 
126v LENS (Sidney). Defining disarmament* progressive* 
4 1 , 7; 3uly, 1977; 9 - i n . 
The author concludes that s t ra tegic arms l i m i t a t i o n 
ta lks were f i r s t proposed in 1964* Fa i lure at d i s -
armament led to the hope that i t might at least be 
possible to I n s t i t u t e a freeze on s t ra teg ic arms* The 
fears for n^i^^tu securlfiH^'^jrlc) disarmament seems 
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u n l i k e l y . Recaus« U»M, la no more then the sum nf thp 
p o l i t i c a l u l l l of I t s member s t a t e s ; I t s Derformsnce so 
far has been l e s s than Inspir ing . 
127. LIND (Ian Y) . Nuclear weapons and communist orax l s . The 
case study of an * act or-or lent ed** aporoach to disarmament. 
Bu l l , of Pea. Pro. 8, 4; 1977? 332-339. 
The author concludes ths t the fa i lure of t rad i t iona l 
arms control and disarmament e f f o r t s has been attributed 
t o the apparently autonomous dynamics of nuclear ueaoons 
developmpnt. Focusing on the Immediate Issues of 
community health and safety raised by the presence of 
large nuclear s t o c k - p i l e s . 
128. UODGfliARD (Sverre) . High mi l i tary technology, security 
and arms contro l . Bu l l , of Pea. Pro. 8, 4; 1977; 
291-295. 
The author concludes that the spec ia l s e s s ion the 'IN 
General A^ssembly on disarmament provides an opoortunlty 
t o rethink the doctrine of deterrence* There has been 
a growing demand by a majority n a t i o n s , big and small , 
r ich and poor to seek Increased secur i ty by louerlno the 
armaments l e v e l . The UN on disarmament could deal ulth 
the e n t i r e complex of disarmament oroblems ulth those 
concerning nuclear weapons and those having to do with 
conventional armaments* 
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129, LODGARD (Sv«re)» The disarmament imperative. Bul l , of 
Pea. Pro. 13, 7; S e p . , 157SJ 195-96. 
Research and development i s the back bone of the modern 
arms race and must be brought under control i f d i s -
armament i s to succeed. The arms t rans fers to the third 
world e s p e c i a l l y the Middle Past and Persian gulf are 
another worry. In 15 years there may be another 21 
nuclearrpouers. There i s distance between uorie and 
deeds in the f i e l d of the disarmament. 
13Q. WYRDAL (Alva) . The game of disarmament. Imp, of Spi . 
on Soc. 22 , 3 ; 1972; 217-220. 
The author concludes that there has been l i t t l e d i s -
armament progress . The two super powers have not worked 
for disarmament. A l^l nuclear-arms-control negot ia t ions 
have been a game, with super-powers playing between 
themselves . The author remarks that only the non-
nuclear-weapons s t a t e s are c a l l e d upon t o make s a c r i f i c e 
in the name of arms c o n t r o l . 
131. QUE5TER (GM). Can p r o l i f e r a t i o n now be stopped. For.Aff. 
53 , 1; Oct . , I974t 77-97 . 
The author concludes that India ' s detonation of a 
nuclear device on f^ay 18, 1974 r a i s e s the riak that 
many more nat ions w i l l acquire nuclear weaoons, but 
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nuclear orol l fsration May nonetheless be slowed or 
stooped i f certain necessary steps are taken* The 
suppliers of nuclesr materials to be more cautious 
and careful in the future and hope to persuade India to 
help to prevent* 
132. RAOOVANOvrc (Lujbomir). New develooments in the 
problem of disarmament. Rev, of Inter. Aff. 17, SOS; 
3une 5, 1971J 7-9. 
The author concludes that there are three recent 
developments relevant to the problem of security in 
central furope. Breznev's proposal for negotiationa 
on arms reduction in the ares* and agreement in the 
SfKLT talks on the subject of negotiations. 
133. ROBERT (Adam). Is general and complete disarmament 
dead. War and Pea. Reo. 12, 2: Nov, 1973? 16-18. 
The author concludes that governments have four 
problems with disarmament. ( l ) Universality of d i s -
armament. (2) Verification of abB»ne9 of arms. (3) Deal-
ing with violat iona. (4) Conduct of confl ict after d i s -
armament. Arms disarmament i s desirable for world 
a tab i l i ty . 
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134. ROTBLAT (3)» Shell u« put an end to th« human race, or 
shall ue r»nounc« nar* PUQ> NBMS Letter. 13, ?: Oct., 
1975? 15-17. 
The ultimate objective of the Rueeell and rineteln was 
to bring all uars to an end» The natural conaeouenees 
of this was the call for general and complete ditarmament* 
It la nou claimed that to call for general and comolete 
disarmament would be harmful* This attitude is un-
acceptable and defeatist* 
135. SAKAMOTO (v). A political desipn for world disarmament. 
PuQ* Hews Letter* 13, 7; Oct*, 1975? 20-22* 
Armament and disarmament should be examined within the 
context of world political trends* In this paper author 
says that arm race, big power hegemony and internal 
bureaucratic politics is generating a trend toward the 
decentralization of power* 
Ato. 
136. SAKHAROV (linden). The neeti for an open word. B u l l . o f t h e / 
Scie* 13 , 7 ; Nov, 1975? 8-9* 
The author feels that the problems of disarmament have 
priority over other problems but these can be solved in 
atmosphere of trust, and confidence between nations. 
The aim of detente should be total prohibition of 
nuclear weapon and full disarmament* 
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137. SHAtLE (« ) • The pursuit of svcurlty* PUQ> Wtwslettgf* 
13, 11 3u ly , 1975; 23» 
If gov/ernment want t o l i b e r a t e the i r c i t i z e n s trcm the 
menace of war, three th ings beeome neeeaasry. 
( l ) Stopping the fabr icat ion of a l l arms* (?) Oeatroylnq 
those nuclear weapons which e x i s t * (3 l Reconvertino the 
indus tr ia l aeotor t o a peace ' t ine economy* 
138* SPiftRT (Xan)* The nuclear god. yorld Today* 3A, 4j 
Apr, 19781 118-127* 
The author concludes that the concept of what 
c o n s t i t u t e s nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n has been changing 
s ince 1970* The increased tens ion between energy end 
s scur i ty needs can not be resolved by technica l 
strategem, but only by the reconstruct ion of an i n t e r -
nat ional p o l i t i c a l eonaensus* 
139. SPINRAD (Bernard). Imol icat ions of SftLT* Sci* and 
Pub* tktr^ 27 , 1? 3an*, 1971? 22-25 . 
The author concludes that nuclear non-oro l i f erat lon 
treaty included a promiae that the super-powers hsd to 
negot ia te on s t r a t e g i c arms l i n i t a t i o n and unt i l SALT 
i s r e a l l y s u c c e s s f u l , the non-pro l i ferat ion treaty w i l l 
not be e f f e c t i v e * 
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140« THftNT (U). For a fflonffntum towards a nuclear dlsarmanient. 
l ap , of S c i . on Soc» 22 , 3 ; 1972j 207«l6 . 
The author concludea that arm race can be more 
d i f f i c u l t than reversing i t * 25 years of negot ia t ions 
saw the f i v e inportant t r e a t i e s * In these negotiationSf 
the t echn ica l s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l quest ions are 
discussed* The t r e a t i e s ca l l ed upon a l l members to 
end arm race* t o reduce the ir mi l i tary budgets* to 
prohibit the use of s p e c i f i c weapons* 
141* THEE («)* fcrms contro i i The r e t r e a t frtsm disarmewent. 
3* of Pea* Res. 14, 2 J 1977j 95-114* 
The author concludes that the arms control as implemented 
in recent yesrs and r e f l e c t e d in a number of mul t i la tera l 
and b i l a t e r a l US-Soviet accords has not halted thp arms 
race , but rather impelled i t s course* 4n ef fort must 
be made t o change d i r e c t i o n and i n i t i a t e the process of 
real disarmament* 
142. TYLOR (Ethel)* R e f l e c t i o n s ! on being consulted* 
P r o o r e s s i v * 42 , 6? Dune, 1978| 20-21* 
The author concludes that United Sta tes has no intent ion 
of pushing for disarmament plans at the United Nations 
s e s s ion on disarmament* The ypar 1978 was a year of 
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f rus tra t ion for women s t r i k e for oeace In the ir e f fort 
against nuelesr weapons* 
143* VESA (U)» The rev iva l of proposals for nuclear- free 
zones. I n s . Rss* Pea, tflo* 5 , i ; 1975? 4 ? - 5 l . 
The author examines that recent ly there has been 
renewed i n t e r e s t in the concept of nuclear free zones. 
Reasons t o t h i s rev iva l Include the NPT review Conference 
Indisn nuclear s s p l o s i o n and the rapid p r o l i f e r a t i o n •> 
due to energy c r i s i s and of peaceful appl icat ion of 
nuclear energy. I t was recognized that HPT could be 
supplemented with regional approach t o non-pro l i f era t ion . 
144. VESA (Unto). The s p e c i a l s e s s ion on disarmamentt A 
turning p o i n t . Current Res , on Pea, apd Vio. 1, 1? 
1978J 1-12. 
The author concludes that the bas ic factor a f fec t ing 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of success for the U.N. Special Session 
devoted t o disarmament i s the o v e r s l l p o l i t i c a l s i tua t ion 
i . e . the s t a t e of great power r e l a t i o n s ; the atmosphere 
between the aligned and non-aligned c o u n t r i e s . In s p i t e 
of u n c e r t a i n t i e s and d i f f i c u l t i e s the Special Session 
on disarmament provides a unique opportunity for the 
in ternat iona l community t o advance towards the gos l s of 
disarmament. 
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145. UERKHEISCT (Don), Oltarmament without t r u s t . 3* of 
Huwian Rel« 19, 2? 1971| 176-183. 
The author concludes that armament race between United 
S t a t e s and Soviet Union has resched the potent ia l of 
human e x t i n c t i o n . But both s i d e s are s incere in the i r 
a s ser ta t ion that they uant peace in the world. The 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of t rus t ing the other s ide prevents an 
a l l out progriMi for peace* 
146. UORID DlSARn/mETNT day. Progressive. 42 , 5; Ray, 1978; 
130. 
Uith world expenditures on weapons aporoaching $400 
b i l l i o n annually, i t i s c l ear that arms race not only 
imperi ls human s u r v i v a l , but a l so aggravates the c r i s i s 
of hunger, poverty and waste of natural resources* 
United Nations adopted August 6, 1978 as a *t</orld 
Disarmament Day*. Further author examines that d i s -
armament and arms control have discussed at hundreds of 
meeting s i n c e 1945 but there has been no progress . 
147. YOUNG (Uayland) disarmamentt Thirty years of f a i l u r e 
In ter . See6* 2 , 3? D e c , 1978? 33-50 . 
The author concludes the mishaps, the i r and 
importance which have obstructed progress towards d i s -
armament over the pass 30 years . The author euggests 
that United Nations Disarmament Centre should be 
etrengthened and an internat ional agency be created 
which would permit s a t e l l i t e monitoring of disarmament 
measures. 
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DISARWAMENT INSPECTION - GENERAL 
148. BINENFELn (^U Some comments on the actual s t a t e of the 
v e r i f i c a t i o n problem concerning chemical weapon* Puo« 
News L e t t e r . • 13, 1; Duly, I975j 35 . 
The main purpose of v e r i f i c a t i o n s should be a complete 
ban on the production and s t o c k - p i l i n g of a l l kinds of 
chemical weapons* P^n adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n system would 
be of primary i n t e r e s t for nations which do not possess 
chemical wespons in order t o protect themselves* However 
the chemical weapons negot ia t ions are s t a n d s t i l l orimsry 
because of the problem of o n - s i t e inspect ion* 
149* BURNS (Richard Dean). Supervis ion, control and inspect ion 
of armsmentet 1919*1941 perspect ive* Orbls* 15, 3 ; Sep*, 
1971; 14-18. 
The author concludes that the d i f f i c u l t i e s in the way 
of arms supervis ion and v e r i f i c a t i o n exoerienced durinc) 
the iRst 20 years* He examines the methods of control 
and superv is ion; o n e - s i t e supervisors commissions, 
report ing commissions, enquirf commiesions. A scheme 
for R L D i e proposed that could eerve the t r i p l e 
objec t ive of reducing mis trus t . 
150. CREENUOOD (Ted). Reconnaissance and. arms contro l . 
S c i e . feme. 228, 2 ; Feb . , 1973; 4-25 . 
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Thff SALT I agreement re l y on Inspect ion by U*S»A* and 
U»S.S«R» of each others s t ra teg ic weaoons. The 
f e a s i b i l i t y of inspect ion could inf luence the form of 
fur ther r e s t r i c t i o n s * ft ban on the tes t ing of new ICBW 
u i t h l im i ted numbers and pre-announcing of tes ts would be 
v e r i f i a b l e * 
151. GUARDIAN ANGELS. Pea. Digest . 1 , i ; Way-3une, I975j 
24. 
This a r t i c l e examines that some day we have guardian 
angels watching over our wor ld . They w i l l be space 
s a t s l l i t e s t whose camera eyes can see small de ta i l s and 
whose e lec t ron ic voices w i l l speed t h i s information to 
people a l l over the globe. They w i l l t e l l us where to 
look for minerals and fresh water and w i l l warn us of 
many dangers* 
152. KAPLAN ( M ) . The v e r i f i c a t i o n of quantimi i n chemical 
disarmament* PUQ* News Le t te r . 13, i ; 3u ly , 1975; 33-34. 
Chemical weapons negot iat ions are at a s t a n d s t i l l 
p r imar i l y because of the problem of on-s i te inspect ion* 
The Japanese proposed convention has evoked in terest on 
both sides (Cast and Uast). I t i s suggested that a study 
group be div ided i n t o two sub-groups to consider 
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tuohnlcal and organltational raquiramenta of an inter-
national varlflcatlon organlaatlons* 
153. LUNDIN (S.3)« Variflcatlon of a chemical dlaarmanent 
treatyt Data baaed literature aoanning» PUQ» Neua Letter* 
13, 1J Duly, 1975? 36. 
tt haa been auggeated that verification of a treaty 
banning development, production and atockpiling of 
chemical ueapons might benefit frnn acannlng of scienti-
fic end technical literature in the chemical field* 
However, concern haa been expressed that in oases where 
C U'QQB*^^ bad been kept secret, it would not be possible 
to use verification methods that disclosed the nature nf 
agent* 
t54» PIRftLAi (Loyna). effective combinations of physico-
chemical mpthods for detection anti identification of 
chemical warfare agents* Puo> News tettei;, 13, 1; Duly, 
1975? 36-37. 
The most outstanding advance in the field of analytical 
organic chemistry has been the rapid development of 
different instrumental techniques* The most suitable 
methods of verifying chemical umtt%99 agents seem to be 
Infrssed • *®»a» ^^^ various types of chromatography. 
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155» ROBERTS (R.C)» Physical va l idat ion* PUQ» N>wt L»tt»r» 
13, 1; 3u ly , 1975; 3 7 . 
nuoH progress has bsen madm towards agrssmsnts banning tha 
production of cHsnioal weapons and des truct ions of existino 
s tockp i l e s* Super power refused t o inspect the s i t e of 
aras s tockp i l e s* One of the remaining i s s u e s i s what has 
been termed, *on s i t s inspection** Therp i s ample space 
within t h i s mi l i su for the development of a v e r i f i c a t i o n 
system which c?n protect and enhrncs the national 
s e o u t l t y of a l l nations* 
156. SCHElNflAN (taursnce)* Safeguarding nuclear materials* 
Bull* of the Ate* S e i e . 30 , 4? Apr*, 1974? 34-35* 
The author deals with the neces s i ty and problem of 
phys ica l secur i ty In deal ing with nuclear materials* 
f l a t s r ia l s could cause a threat t o publ ic health Bnd 
the f t oould cause a danger to nation or internat ional 
securi ty* The problem i s an in ternat iona l oroblem and 
has to be deal t within sn i n t e r n s t i o n a l context* 
157. SCHUWfl^ NN ( G ) * Technical control and the non-prol i ferat ion 
of nuclear weapon* Seie* yerld* 16, 3? 197?j 1§-17. 
The author concludes that t o t a l nuclear disarmament, 
advocated by s o c i a l i s t and non-aligned s t a t e s can not be 
attained only in non-pro l l f era t i cn trpsty because grow-
ing world wide generation of e l e c t r i c i t y by nuclear 
power s t a t i n n s that are capable of producing plutonii«n 
that enn be used in nuclear weapons. Inspection and 
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t o 
v e r i f i c a t i o n ar» keptj\i9e of t echn ica l meann* Thua the 
Isaua of taohnleal control thould not a f fec t lmDleiienta< 
t lon of the non-pro l i ferat ion treatyt 
HISTORY OF MFnOTT,TTTnw<; 
158« COrrcY (3o8er>h I ) . S t ra teg i c Arms Limitatlone nnd 
European aecurity* Inter»ftff» 47, 4; Oct, 1'^t^: 
692-717. 
The author concludes that four typet of armt control 
measurea under eonaideration by the Soviet Union and 
U»S«A« Thay include l i a i t i n g the number of atrntpoic 
nuclear de l ivery veh l e laa , freezing Qual i tat ive 
Imorovementa and r e s t r i c t i n g a n t i - b a l l i s t i c system. 
159, corrtY ( 3 , I . ) . The Savor of S*LT. f^ull* of l i to. Sole* 
29 , 5? Hay, 1973? 9. 
The author concludes that s t r a t e g i c arms l i m l t e t i o n s 
agreement should be considered on t h e i r merits? i f 
U«S*At« does not proceed with new ueapons, she w i l l be 
outc lassed f i v e years or w i l l weaken her internat ional 
p o s i t i o n . But there are oroapecta of contro l l ino both 
type of raoea through future negot ia t ions* 
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160. GURNEY (RaiRsdell* ) • Arms and the men. B u l l , of thg 
Ato. S c i e . 15, 9; 3an, 1975? 23-33 . 
rrom Truman t o Brezhnev there was a Beries of h is tory 
of in ternat ional weapons n e g o t i a t i o n s . But the author 
asks the v a l i d i t y of these neoot ia t ions* because wars 
and arms race continue* In t h i s p o s i t i o n the disarmament 
negot ia t ions are ser ious or a shou-oieces* The author 
sees the SALT agreements as step toward disarmament* 
161. HOHENEflSER (Kurt). National i n s e c u r i t y . Environment. 
14, 8; Oct . , 1972? 2 - 7 . 
The author concludes that s t r a t e g i c Arms Limitation 
Talks resume. The main point to remember i s that both 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. have more weapons than they can use 
and surv ive . 
162. IMAI (Ryukichi) . 3aoan and the world of SALT. S c i . and 
Pub. Aff. 27 , 10; D e c , 1971J 13-16. 
The author concludes that 3span i s in teres t ed in the 
durab i l i ty of a SAtLT agreement. The day such an agree-
ment l o s e s i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s can be the day NPT world 
order c o l l a p s e s . There i s always a chance that e i ther 
acc identa l ly or d e l i b e r a t e l y the world of SALT w i l l 
become inoperat ive and nuclear weapons w i l l be used to 
k i l l people and destroy c i t i e s . 
22 
163. KEYS (Donald F ) » las t chanca for U.S-Sovlet oact. 
War and Paa> Rep* 22, 8? Oct . , 1971; l A - l S . 
The author ooncludaa that tha current a tra teg l c 
ariia l i m i t a t i o n ta lka (SALT) and dlearmawent conference 
in Geneva repreaenta the end of two pouer arma n«>qotla<-
tiona* It aeema poaalble that SALT t a l k s between U5 and 
Soviet Union w i l l arr ive at en agreement on a n t i -
b a l l i a t i c miaai leai 
164. LAPP (Ralph r ) . SALT, fllRV and f i r a t i t r l k e . Bul l * of 
the Ato. Sole* 28 , 3 ; Wat*, 1972; 21 -26 . 
The author concludes that the technology of the WIRV, 
the mul t ip le independently targetable recent ly veh ic l e 
(or warhead), tend t o perpetuate a cer ta in decree of 
ambiguity in any s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n agreement, 
unless a system of v e r i f i c a t i o n i s adopted* S tra teg i c 
arma l i m i t a t i o n agreement on m i s s i l e s can be v e r i f i e d 
by reconnaiaaance from the a ir or from o r b i t , the WIRV 
ambiguity w i l l continue t o fmed the fear of a f i r a t -
s t r ike* 
165. SCOVILLr (Herber t ) . Beyond SALT one. For. Aff . 50, 3 ; 
Apr. , 1972; 488-50n. 
The author concludes that agreement on of fens ive 
weapons, e i ther land or submarine - based w i l l be more 
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d i f f i c u l t to achieve* SoRe future etepe Include 
r e s t r i c t i n g q u a l i t a t i v e Iworovements In ttratecjlc ueaoons 
and contro l l ing the number of m i s s i l e t e s t f i r lnos 
author emphasises that even a l imi ted agreement at SffLT 
can mark the beginning of a new era In the nuclear 
weapons age* 
166. THOSe ARfIS t a l k s , ^ c o . 241 , 6693 | D e c , 4 , I971j 
52-53 . 
In t h i s a r t i c l e the progress of arms negot ia t ions s ince 
1961 on the s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s , mutual and 
balanced force reduct ion, the conference of the committee 
on disarmament and other conferences as yet only prooosed* 
The meetings of min i s t ers and diplomats devoted the ir 
time to curb the srm race* 
167. YOU Hfkni i t , ue w i l l d i scuss I t . Eco* 240, 6673; 
Feb. 4 , 1972; 16-17. 
The a r t i c l e examines the s ign of harmony that include 
the agreement t o d i scuss fUBf^ system before the s t r a t e g i c 
weapons. The S o v i e t s have a l so been part l c ioa t ing 
cooperat ive ly in the germ warfare t a l k s at Geneva and 
c a l l i n g for f i v e power nuclear d i s c u s s i o n s . 
NEGOTIATED SAFEGUARD AGAINST ACClDFNTS 
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1 6 8 . U .N . GLOBAL hot l l n » . Pea . D i o a t . 1 , 1? Flay-3unef 
1976; 2 7 . 
The author concludea t h a t d i r t c t communication 
betwean government l e a d e r a of neighbouring eount r lps 
may be neeeaaary i n an emergency t o avoid u a r . ftoacow 
nnd Unshin f ton are a l ready l i n k e d by a h o t - l i n e . There 
should be such ayatpm f o r a l l n a t i o n a . 
PREVENTION OF SPREAD OF NUCLEAR UEAPONS 
169 . 8ARNABY ( F r a n k ) . N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n T r e a t y gloom. 
New S o l e . 1 2 , 5 j June 5 , 1975; 538 . 
The U . S . S . R . and U .S .A . d i d not commit themaelves t o 
t e a t ban or r e d u c t i o n i n the a t r a t e g i c d e l i v e r y of 
v e h i c l e a . They a lao re fused t o promise not t o t h r e a t e n 
t o use nuc lear weapons aga ins t non-nuc lear s t a t e s . 
170 . BURKE (Gerard K ) . F i g h t i n g the u n t h i n k a b l e , m lc lesr 
uar i n the 1980s. W i l . R e v . 5 9 . 6 ; 3une , 1978; 9 - 1 9 . 
The author concludes t h a t u i t h the Sov ie t b u i l d up 
and modern iza t ion of i t a s t r a t e g i c nuc lear fo rcea and 
the r e d u c t i o n of U.S» s t r a t e g i c nuc lear fo rce c a p a b i l i t y , 
nuc lear w a r f a r e i n t h e 1980s i s not an I m p o s s i b i l i t y . As 
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th« r i c h e s t and most pouvrful nation on tarthf can 
United S t a t e s afford to continue to Ignore the grouinq 
s t r a t e g i c imbalance* 
171. CinrFI-R!n/ILLA (Claudio ft). Rode! of nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n . I n t e r . I n t e r a c t i o n . 4 , 3? l977? i 9 i - 9 8 . 
The author concludes that in flay 1975, the Hon-
P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty Review Conference at Geneva 
f a i l e d to diminish the po tent ia l for further nuclear 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n by near*nucle8r e t a t e e . Assuming that 
eecuri ty needs of such s t a t e s as wel l as the ir domestic 
development needs w i l l require more nuclear technique. 
172. DOCTOR (ftdi H). India ' s nuclear p o l i c y . Indian J . of 
Pol . Sc . 32 , 3 : 3u ly«Sep. , l97l? 43-48 . 
The author conclude® that India** p o s s i b l e acquis i t ion 
of nuclear weapon i s re la ted t o i t s perception of 
threa t s t o national s e c u r i t y . Ind ia ' s developmpnt Into 
a f u l l - f l e d g e d nuclear power would i s s u e national 
i n t e r e s t and advance Indian sc ience and technology, 
Ind ia ' s large depos i t s of thorium and uranium would be 
developed and u t i l i z e d . 
173. CKLUND (Sigvard) . Disarmament and internat ional 
contro l . Imp, of S c i . on Sec . ?? , 3? 1972 J 263-68. 
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The 8uthe»r •xanlnet that nuclear n a t v r l a l t used in 
energy generation are not s e c r e t e l y diverted to ueaoons 
use and to assure the non-nuclear weapons s t a t e s that 
they w i l l be used for peaceful puroose* 
174. EPSTEIN (Ui l l lam) , f a l l u r e at the NPT review conference. 
Bull* of »to» S o l e . 2 0 , 10; SeP.t 1975; 46-48. 
The p a r t i e s t o Non-Prol i ferat ion Treaty met In Geneva. 
The non-nuclear powers were demanding that nuclear 
powers l i v e up t o t h e i r commitments. The most 
important demands were t o end underground nuclear t e s t s t 
a pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
s t a t e s t and to developing countries in peaceful use of 
nuclear energy and agreement to reepect nuclear-free 
zone. 
175. EPSTEIN ( u l l l i a m ) . Weasure to save the NPT. Survival . 
17, 6; NOV., 1975; 2S6. 
The author examines that U.S.S.R. and U.*:.^. should 
stop underground nuclear t e s t s for the next f i v e years , 
prevention of new weapons for the next S years and 
super powers must promise not to use nuclear weapons 
against the other non-nuclear c o u n t r i e s . In t h i s way 
Non-Prol i ferat ion Treaty can be saved. 
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176. EPSTCIN (y)* Nucl«er*fre« lone . S o l e , me* 233, 5? 
Nov., 1975; 25-35 . 
Th« author concludes that the f a i l u r e of r e c e l t 
attempts to r e v i t a l i z e the non-prol i ferat ion treaty 
has led t o renewed Interes t in reg ional mult i -nat ional 
pacts as an a l t e r n a t i v e uay of preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons. 
177. EPSTEIN ( u i l l i a m ) . The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear 
weapons. Scie* flme. 232 , 4; Apr, 1975J 18-33. 
The author f e e l s that a l l arms control t r e a t i e s 
f a i l e d t o stop nuclear t e s t s and s toc( ( -pi l ing of 
weapons. India ' s t e s t may encourage near-nuclear 
nations t o acquire nuclear power and weapons. To stop 
a l l these nuclear t e s t i t i s necessary to e s tab l i sh 
nuc lear- free zone. These th ings can be done only 
through United Nations. 
178. riRflAGE (Edwin arown). The treaty on the non-prol i fera-
t i o n of nuclear weapons, ftwe.3. of In ter . Law* 63 , 4? 
Oct^, 1969J 711-15. 
The author concludes that a non-pro l i ferat ion treaty 
must prohibit both the production of nuclear weaoons by 
non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s and the acqu i s i t i on of nuclear 
weapons by s t a t e s which do not have the capacity to 
oroduce the i r own. 
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179. HftLASZ (Louis ) . Nucltar k e t t l e Is on the b o l l . £ar 
Ea»* Cco» Rev. 86, 47; Nov. , 29 , 1974? 25-26. 
India has Joined the U.S .A. , U.S.S.R*, B r i t a i n , China, 
and Franea In the nucle?r c lub . If there la no In ter -
natlonial agreement t o U n i t arne growth, such other 
countr ies as B r a z i l , I srae l* Pakistan, 3aoan may soon 
j o i n other in producing plutonium In nuclear r e a c t o r s . 
180 . GANDHI ( B e t r a y e d ) . Tar Cas. r c o . Rev. 8 4 , 2 1 ; Way 2 7 , 
1974J 1 3 . 
India ' s exolosion of a nuclear device may enhance her 
s t a t u s , but It has mads no contribut ion totfa rds solvinq 
her economic and agr icu l ture oroblems. Bangle O^sh and 
Pakistan which now vows t o makp nuclear weapons. It 
increases the danger of d i sas trous c o n f l i c t in South 
Atsia. It betrays the dream of ^ahatma Candhl and 
Nehru that India would help the world away from war. 
181. GEYER (ftlan). Pro l i f era t ion dead lock . Christ isn Csnt. 
12, 23? 3une l5-3uly 2 , 1975? 621-22. 
The 4-week non-prol i ferat ion treaty review conference 
in Geneva was dominated by deadlock. The treaty ia the 
most Important disarmament agreement now in e f f e c t , but 
many observers question the s i n c e r i t y of the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
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182» KENNEDY (Edward W)» For swearing the bomb. Sat.Rev* 
10, 2 ; Sep. 6 , 1976; 7, 57, 
The author la dlaapoolnted with the a t t i tude of 
United Statea and Ruaala* He aaya that they had 
Made no attempt t o l i m i t the i r weapona* He thlnka 
that nuclear powers could agree t o ban a l l nuclear 
t e a t s without any harm t o t h e i r aecur l ty . 
183, KOHL (Damea) Se l l ing M.I.Tt The Iranian Uranium 
connect ion. The Nation. 220, 16j Apr. 26 , 1974; 
50-53 . 
The Plaaaachuaetta I n s t i t u t e of Technology la 
preparing t o a e l l nuclear know-how to the government 
of Iran. Iran could become a nuclear power. An 
organlaation ca l l ed the aclVnce act ion coordinating 
committee la oppoalng n . I . T . In tranafer of technica l 
a k l l l . 
184. KRIEGER (David). Terror i s t s and nuclear technology. 
B u l l , of ftto. S o l e . 3une, 1975J 28-34 . 
Unt i l now, the only organisat ions to possess nuclear 
weapons were government. But i t i s not unl ikely that 
some groups knows as t e r r o r i s t w i l l achieve nuclear 
weapon. In t h i s esssy the author mentions the way in 
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which t e r r o r i s t group nay gain possffsaiona of nuclear 
weapona* They might achieve nuclear capab i l i ty by 
s t e a l i n g an aaaembled ueaponf buylnq or reopivino one 
from a nuclear powers and constructing t h e i r own bomb 
from mater ia ls bought or s to l en from the nuclear oower 
industry* 
185* LENS (Sidney) . Peraoectivea* ProQre88ive« 4 f 6j 
3une, 1977? 10-11. 
The author concludes that Carter*s suspension of work 
on breeder reactora and nuclear orocess ing plant in 
south Carolina i s a v i c tory for the ant i -nuclear move-
ment, but w i l l have no e f f e c t on the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of 
nuclear weapons* 
186, Lessees or the nuclear age. Far Cas. Ceo* ffev. 93,?8j 
3uly 9, 1976 J 23* 
The author concludes that nassaehuset ts I n s t i t u t e of 
Technology i s t ra in ing Taiwanese engineers t o build 
soph i s t i ca ted m i s s i l e guidance system. This r a i s e s the 
threat that Taiwan may soon be producing nuclear weaoona 
Bnd mias i l ea or a i r c r a f t . 
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187« LIU (L«oyuoh)« China as a nuclear oouar in world 
politic*. Can, of Pol«9ci« 8, 7; 3una, 1975? 356-358. 
According to author tha preaant ayatam could braak 
down b9caiJiB9 of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n or renaual of 
arma race. China'a aim ia to break the nuclear 
monopoly of the auper powera. 
233, 21 
188. LOST OPPmrUNlTY. Scie. ^ a . / A u q . , 1975J 46. 
hn in te rna t iona l confarenoc in ftay, 1975, reviewed 
the t rea ty on the non-pro l i fe ra t ion of nuclear weapona. 
The nuclear powera have not kept t h e i r aidea of the 
bargain, and re jected fur ther propoaalt , u n t i l the 
beginning of 1970'a American nuclear pol icy waa deter -
mined by the concern that paaaing on of nuclear techno-
logy to areaa of tenaion URC Near Caat would contradict 
goal of tha non-pro l i fe ra t ion of nuclear weapona but the 
del ivery of nuclear power plants to Cgypt. This policy 
waa breached for the f i r s t t ime. 
189, WrNOCT SHAUSEN ( H e r a t ) . U i l l West Germany go nuclear. 
Orbis. 16, 2? Sep. , 1972; 411-13. 
The author concludes that Ueat Germany as technological ly 
capable of producing nuclear arms but eoneider that 
country haa no w i l l to undertake the pro jec t . He further 
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•ays that nuclear pnergy and technolog ica l development 
are des ired for Industr ia l and econtMlc reasons* 
190, WURPMY (Charles H), Plalnland China's evolving nuclear 
de terrent . B u l l , of the ftto» Sole* 28 , 1J 3 a n . , 1972j 
28-35 . 
The author concludes that over the l a s t ten or f i f t e e n 
years* mainland China has been bui lding a s o l i d founda-
t i o n for i t s evolving nuclear deterrent-uhieh must be 
based on long range, m i s s i l e - d e l i v e r e d , thermonuclear 
ueapons. 
l 9 i . flYROAL (Alva) . The in ternat iona l control of disarmament. 
S c i e . ftme. 231 , 4; Oct . , 1974J 21 -23 . 
The author b e l i e v e s that p o l i t i c a l commitment made for 
disarmament i s the most r e l i a b l e guarantee, duthor 
wants an internat ional disarmament control agency for 
the control of disarm«Rent. This agency should secure 
knowledge sbout arms and disarmament. 
912. NANDA (Krlsh) . U l l l India go nuclear . 5 e l . and Pub. 
Iftff. 27 , 10; D e c , 1971J 39-41 . 
The author concludes that government of India t o go 
nuclear can be expected u i th increasing nuclear develop-
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went of Chlna«governiRent*8 r e t l s t a n c e to golnq nuclpat 
nay be expeoted t o decrease Indirect r e l a t i o n to 
Inoreatlng disunion with the ranks of oonciress party. 
193, NARASIWHAN ( « . « • ) • Nuclear opt ion, The Indian dilemma. 
Indo Asia* 9, 4? 1967; 275. 
The author ooneludea that explosion of tuo Chinese 
atom bOMbSf the demand for an Indian nuclear bomb can 
no longer be s i lenced* The nuclear non-prol i ferat ion 
treaty could protect India against the expensive 
manufacture of her own atonic weapons* The provis ion 
of atomic weapons for India would be a heavier load on 
the economy* 
194. NISHI KAUA (3)* Nuclear development and the third 
world* On the transfer of technology In the nuclear 
f i e l d . Pup* News Let ter . 13, 12? Oct*, l975j 40-42* 
Indians explosion of a nuclear device on nay 16, 1974, 
was a natural consequence of the super power's monopoly 
of nuclear power and t h e i r f a i l u r e to r e a l i z e real n u c 
lear disarmament* In the third world strong movement 
a r i s e against the super powers attempt to use t h i s area 
as a t e s t place for t h e i r technology* 
lOi 
195. NON-PROLIFERATION OF nuclear weapons* U.N> Won* Chro* 
11 , 9? Oct . , 1974? 50-52 . 
During the general debate In general assembly of 
U.N. In Sept l974y India spoke in defence of i t a nuclear 
underground peaceful explos ion . Pakistan took the 
p o s i t i o n that there was no d i f ference between a nuclear 
explosion for peaceful puroose and one for the develop-
ment of a weapon. U.K. and other countr ies urged the 
need of nuclear non-pro l i ferat ion treaty* 
196. PEWP£L (T.D). Japan's nuclear a l l e r g y . Current His* 
68 , 404J 1975; 169-70* 
The author concludes that i t i s doubtful that public 
pressure w i l l prevent the expansion of nuclear a c t i v i t i e s 
in 38P8n* It i s l i k e l y that over the long run there w i l l 
be further erosion of the 3apanese p u b l i c ' s re s i s tance 
t o nuclear weapons. 
197. PIFRRE (Andrew 3)* Nuclesr diplomacy, B r i t a i n , France 
and America. For* «tff* 49 , 2 ; 3an, 1971; 283-302* 
The author begins h i s ana lys i s of western ITurope's 
nuclear r o l e with a d i scuss ion of the inf luence of the 
SALT-conference on the pos i t ion of Europe* U*S* should 
allow England to supply France with technica l know-how 
105 
and f i ss ionable ma te r i a l . Woreover Important offer for 
d i r ec t aid could be made to England and Trance for the 
building and maintenance of PIIRV weapons* 
198. QUESTER (George M). Parls^ Pre to r la t Peking, p ro l i f e r a -
t i o n . Bul l , of l>to. Sc le . 36, 8; Oct. , 1970; 12-16. 
The author concludes tha t the nuclear non-prol i ferat ion 
t rps ty l i m i t s nuclear weapons to the present holders , 
U.K, U.S, U.S.5.R, France and China. Trance end China 
do not Intend to sign the t r e a t y . Several non-nuclear 
nations are very near to having or capabi l i ty of 
producing nuclear weaoons. 
199. QUESTER (George H). Soviet policy on the nuclear non-
p ro l i f e r a t ion t r e a t y . Cor. I n t e r . Law 3 . 5, 1? 197?; 
17-19. 
The author concludes thct though Soviet Union has 
favoured prohibi t ing the spread of nuclear weapons 
but the s ince r i ty of the Soviet motives could be held 
suspect . Since noscow rejected any form of in te rna -
t iona l Inspect ion. 
200. RWftN (ff .S.) . India, a case of oower without force. 
I n t e r . 3 . 30, 2j Sep, 1975; 299-325. 
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According t o author that India r e a l i z e d that nuclear 
energy could b« s i g n i f i c a n t for i t t economic development. 
Nehru condemned the manufacturet t e s t i n g and stock-
p i l i n g of nuclear weapons* India must become economically 
and t e o h n o l o g l c s l l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and Indeoendent. 
2 0 1 . RAHQERG (Bennett)* Tact ica l advantages of opening 
pos i t ion ing s t r a t e g i e s * Lesson ffom the sea-bed arms 
control t a l k s , 1967-1970. J . of r-ppf, Reso*?1. 4i ? 
Dect 1977; 685-700. 
The suthor a s s e s s e s Soviet snd American pos i t ion ing 
strategy during the negot ia t ion of the 1971 treaty 
banning nuclear weapons snd other weaoons of mass 
des truct ion from the sea-bed* 
202 . RETORD (Robert u ) . Problems of nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
Cand. I n s t , of Inter* Aiff. 34 , IT Way, 1975: 44-59. 
India has experienced her f i r s t nuclear explosion for 
peaceful ourooses* As more countries became 'nuclear'* 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n control d i f f i c u l t i e s Increased. Trance, 
China and India have not signed thp nuclear o r o l l f e r a t i o n 
t r e a t y . The r e a u l t s of peaceful nuclear exoloelons for 
purposes such as mining or excavation have dlsaooolntino* 
In 1956 Canada agreed t o provide a nuclear reactor tn 
India for oeaeeful ouroose but in 1964 Indis uss produc-
ing fuel rods from I t s r e a c t o r s . 
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7.0Z* SPRINRARN (3«ro«e)» The oo»i»i»tlc« of disarmampnt. 
War. Pea» Rep, 13, It Sep*, l975j 11-13 . 
According t o author dltarinament conferences attracted 
a l o t of a t t ent ion but they are meaninglete* The 
s trongest bond between the two super-pouers I s the i r 
agreeiient not t o agres t o t r e a t i e s which would orevent 
the developMent of more powerful weapons* 
204 . STftiRES (3ohn). Control l ing the new p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
Nature* 260, 107? Rar . , 11 , l976j 88-87. 
The author concludes that nuclear non-prol i ferat ion 
treaty i s not e f f e c t i v e to control the spread of nuclear 
weapons* It i s simply not p o s s i b l e t o prevent a country 
from acquiring the a b i l i t y to produce nuclear powers. 
Unti l now the only organisat ions to possess nuclear 
weapons were governments* But from here on i t i s not 
unl ike ly that some groups more commonly thought of as 
t e r r o r i s t w i l l achieve a nuclear weapon c a p a b i l i t y . 
205. SUBRAHWANYftW ( K ) . Can nuclear arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
contr ibute t o world s e c u r i t y . Imp, of 5 c i e . on Soe. 7?,3t 
1972 J 243-46. 
The author concludes that nuclear weapons pro l i f era t ion 
i s myth favouring the i n t e r e s t of the present f ive 
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nucleat powers* TH« aim should not be simoly to freeze 
the numbsT- of nuclear weapons s t a t e s but t o reduce 
mi l i tary advantages and p r e s t i g e that possess ion of such 
weapons confers* 
206. SUBRAHWAMYftH ( K ) . Ind ia ' s s e c u r i t y . Surviva l . 13, 5? 
Wsy, 19711 154-159. 
The author concludes that the weapons programs India 
w i l l undsrtaks in the next f i v e years t o enable her to 
meet the conventional threat s from China and Pakistan. 
Therafore i f India i s to maintain an e f f e c t i v e voice in 
the world* she must develop a nuclear caoab i l i t y of her 
own. 
207. SUEET ( u i l l l a m ) . Non-prof l i forat ion treaty and the third 
world. Al ternat ive . 2 , 4j Dee*, 1976; 405-A20. 
The author concludes that the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the 
non-pro l l fprs t ion t rea ty has remained t o the major 
a l l i a n c e systems of the two super-powers and i t s f a i l u r e 
now depends on the r e e o n c i l i e t i o n of d i f f er ing views 
concerning v^y and how the sprF>ad of nuclear weapons 
should be prevented. India has always been the most 
c r i t i c of the t r e a t y . 
208. THE niSSiNC super-power. Eco« 240, 6675: 3uly H , 
1971; 14-15. 
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This a r t i c l e extfiinet that Dapaneae are u t i l i z i n g nuclear 
power for peaceful purposes and are building rockets* She 
a l so planned to increase i t s sub-narine production t o 
defend the dapeneae merchant f l e e t * 
209, THEN THERE were s ix* Scie* fmp* 2 3 1 , 1? 3u ly , 1974; 
46, 
India joined the nuclear club on flay 18, 1974 when she 
exploded a ten to f i f t e e n ki loton device in Rajlsthan 
d e s e r t , India has spent $ 315 n i l l i o n on atomic energy 
for the next f i v e years , India ' s claim to be interes ted 
only in the c i v i l engineering aspects of t s s t i n g . It was 
suggested that the purpose of bomb uas t o force the U,S, 
and U«S,S,i^, t o come to grips u l th disarmament, 
210, WADLDu (Rene)» The nuclear oompromiae. Trans* Pers, 
2 , 3 ; Sep, , 1975? 1 1 , 15. 
The U,S, and U,S,8,R, worked together t o prevent 
d e t a i l e d scrut iny of problems of nuclear divers ion 
and other important problem, Regarding disarmament, 
they swept everything behind the smoke screen of s a l t 
and l a b e l l e d c r i t i c s as * enemies of de tente* , Rut yet 
there are many reasons for concern for example, the 
growing nuclear s t o c k p i l e s , nuclear t e s t by India and 
sa le of nuclear reactora to countr ies in tense ares* 
RrciONftL DI^ /^ fr^ fflWrMT l i O 
2 1 1 . BADGLEY (3ohn). An American policy to accommodate Aalan 
in teresta in the Indian Ocean* Sale ffcy>l5> 4; 1971; 
2 -10 . 
The author concludes that in view of the Immediate 
in tereata of 3apant I n d i a , China and Soviet Union in 
the Indian Ocean, the Nixon Administration should make 
a major e f f o r t to prevent s t ra teg ic c o n f l i c t in the area* 
The Antarct ic Treaty of 1958 to the Indian Ocean would 
achieve two object ives} the s t ra teg ic security of that 
region and the world community and the develooment of 
scipnce and technology of Asia* 
212. CVRON ( Y a i r ) . l a rae l and ths atom* Orbis* 17, 4? Nov., 
1974 J 1326-28. 
The author examines that i f I s r a e l produced weaoona, 
then the A^abs would acquire them a lso , l i k e l y from 
the Soviets . I f Airabs a t tack , l a r a e l w i l l go nuclear; 
the existence of nuclear f a c i l i t i e s would indicate to 
Arab that I s r a e l waa superior in science and technology. 
213. INDIAN OCEAN - a zone of oeace. U.N* Won* Chro.6, 1 1 ; 
Nov*, I 9 7 i ; 184. 
I l l 
Ceylon proposed that the countries bordering the 
Indian Ocean unite to preserve this as a zone of 
peace* Fialaysia spoke in support of this proposal* 
Egypt, Iran, Oman, Yemen all supported Indian Ocean 
as a peace of zone* China, Thailand, Senegal, ^ eoal 
and Bhutan supported the idea of certain areas beino 
designated as zone of peace* 
214* 3AISHANKAR (s). Nuclear cartelisation, theory and 
practice. Too* and Pol, Ueek* 12, 20? f^ay 14, 1977: 
798-802* 
The author concludes that the era of the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has been characterised 
by increasing transfers of nuclear facilities across 
national boundaries* Wopt of these transfer recioipnts 
which include India are nuclear threshold nations uho 
are not parties to the NPT evidpnce is oresented in 
this study that technical developments in India is yipld* 
ing this nation a growing military potential* 
215. KHALILZAD (Z)* Pakistan, the making of a nuclear oouer 
Asian Sur* 16, 6j Dune, l976j 581-592* 
The article focuses on the military potential of 
civilian nuclear programs uith particular reference to 
ii2 
the Pakistani axparienoe* Incentiwea, and diaincentivea 
for Pakistan** aoquia l t lon of nuclear weapons, the imoart 
of aueh an acqu i s i t i on on regional s t a b i l i t y and 
Pakis tan's securitf, i s snalyzed* 
216. KOLQ (Alhajl 5ule)» Nucleat-Free Zone demanded 
N. Africa. 13, 7 -8; I 9 7 i ; 7. 
The author concludes that Soviet Union and the United 
S ta te s t o guarantee Kfrica's continued s ta tus as e 
nuclearofres zone by excluding the i r r i v a l r i e s from the 
continent* African wanted nuclear dlsarmement the 
highest p r i o r i t y in any plan for general and comolete 
disarmament* 
217. MINOR (W«S)« China's nuclear development program. 
Asian Sur. 16, 6j 3une, I976j 571-579, 
The author examines that the Chinese nuclear program 
begun in 1950, has progrsssed rap id ly . The f i r s t 
success fu l t e s t explosion occured in 1964 and in s o i t e 
of delays and se t -backs , the Chinese advanced fbom atomic 
to thermo-nuclear t e s t i n g . 
218. fIUKER3EC ( o ) . Ind ia ' s nuclear t e s t and Pakistan. 
India Q. 30, 4j n e t - D e c , 1974; 262-270. 
ua 
The author concludes that i f I t i s to maintain the 
c r e d i t a b l l l t y of i t s peaceful o r o f e s s i o n , India w i l l 
have t o g ive a very convincing argument for any 
object ion to the Pakistani UN proposal that Indian 
nuclear f a c i l i t i e s should be put under internat ional 
safeguard* 
219, RAO ( R . R . ) . India ' s nuclear orogress , a balance sheet . 
India q. 3n, 4? O c t - D e c , 1974? ?39-?53, 
The author concludes that India 's i n t e r e s t in the 
development of atomic energy dates from the time the 
country attained independence* Although the country 
has achieved a high degree in many areas of nuclear 
technology* 
220. REDICK (Dohu R)* Regional nuclear arms control In 
Latin America. In ter . Pro. 12, 10; Seo*, 1975T 4i";-4«>, 
The treaty for the orohib i t ion of nuclear ueeoons 
in Latin America was signed In 1967 and i s now In 
force for 18 Latin American nations* ^articular 
a t tent ion i s given to the pos i t i ons of kpy Latin Ameri-
can nat ions within the reg ion , nuclear weaoons s t a t e s 
and those nations re ta in ing t e r r i t o r i a l in teres t within 
the nuclear weapons-free zone* A Latin Rmerlcan 
nuclear- fres -zone i s a model for the world* 
1 1 4 
221 . SORFWI^ CW (3.8)« tuc icar deterrence and ^soen'a 
defence* Agian f^fr* 7, 2j Nov-Dec, 1974? 55-69, 
The author concludes that the 3aoanese have the 
technolog ica l and Industr ia l knou-hou to develop 
an indigenous nuclear force* It uould apoear that 
the prospect of p o l i t i c a l gain uould be the most 
press ing reason for making a short-term dec is ion to 
Join the nuclear club in next feu years* 
222* SUBRAM N^lAN ( R * R * ) . India and bomb, an overview* 
India Q* 30 , 4; Oct -Opc , 1974; 295-99, 
The aiitihor concludes that India's peaceful nuclear 
explosion can be viewed in term of a 'domestic' 
p o l i t i c a l dec i s ion taken in the l i g h t of various 
in ternat iona l developments during the past two decades* 
The bomb dec i s ion uas made over two years ago due to 
i r r a t i o n a l po l icy of U*S«A* touards India* 
223* SURI (0*D*)* India ' s progress In the nuclear f i e l d . 
Indo-Asia* 15, 4t l973j 304. 
Author s t r e s s e s that the fear i s expressed that 
India, being the f i r s t country in the third uorld to 
possess atomic research and could a l s o be the f i r s t to 
develop an atomic bomb* India has p o t e n t i a l i t y to 
employ her nuclear research into mi l i tary object ives* 
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224. SUftWy (S#)» « wsepon* strategy for a nuclear India. 
India Q. 30 , 4? Oot -Oec , 1974? 271-275. 
The author eoncludet that with the t e s t i n g of a 
nuclear device In nay 1974» the antl-bcwib lobby has 
col lapsed in India. By becoming a nuclear power but 
not a nuclear weapons powerf Indian secur i ty r i sks have 
increased. 
2 2 5 . THE UETK. Far Cas. Eeo^ Rev. 99t 13 ; War. 3 1 , 1978: 
5 . 
China conducted a nuclear explosion in the atmospher? 
at Lop Nor on March 16, 1978. On March 17, the 2'7-month 
earthquake a l er t In Peking region was l i f t e d . A nuclear 
free-zone can be more far-reaching reducing v e r t i c a l 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n a l s o . In 1974 China gained supoort for » 
study on nuclear free-zones at U.N. General Asssmbly. 
Such a study would help to Iron out the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
which at present hinder the progress of such zone. 
226. VANCLCAiVr (U.R. ) . Nuclear aspects of future US security 
pol icy In Asia. Orbis. 19, 3 : 5 e o . , 1975? 1152-1181. 
The author concludes that If the US I s to have a 
strong mi l i tary capab i l i t y with respect to Asia her 
choice of strstegft and forces i s constrained by the 
iU 
experience in Vletnem and by the condition that limit 
the creditability of strategic nuclear threats* 9eth 
the non-proliferation treaty and the idea of nuclear-
free lonps have the common aim of reduclnc? the danoer 
of nuclear war* 
227. VAYRYNEN (Raimo). South Africa: A coming nuclear 
weapons power Inst. Res* on Pea» and Vic* 7, 1: 1977. 
34-47. 
The author concludes that South Africa has been In 
several aspects active in improving her position in 
the world nuclear market* Being a major producer of 
uranium, she has participated in the international 
uranium cartel*U*S. and Trance has been active in 
providing technological know-how on the uranium enrich. 
ment • 
228. ZONES er peace. U.W. Won. Chro. 11, 9j Oct., 1974? 
50-51. 
The desirability of establishing lones of p?ace In 
which there would be no nuclear weapons. This was 
oroposed by Pakistan, Kuwait, Strain were Interested 
in one xone in their area, while the other references 
were to the Indian Ocean. 
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229. AKMUT ( A » A . ) . Nuclear s trategy v i s - a - v i s the third 
world. Pakistan Hor. 27 , 2 ; 1994: 18-28. 
The author concludes that the t e s t ban and nuclear 
non-pro l i ferat ion t r e a t i e s i l l u s t r a t e the des ire of the 
power b locs of the f i r s t and second world to retard the 
growth of the third world. On the othpr hand the pledoe 
of the U.K, the U.S.S.R. and U.S. t o continue negot iat ions 
towards a complete t e s t ban has not been honoured. A 
complete cessat ion of t e s t i n g i s an e s s e n t i a l element 
towards disarmament. 
230. ASSEMBLY (SiDOPTS r e s o l u t i o n s on nuclear weapons t e s t s , 
free zones and re lated ques t ions . U.S. Won. Chro. 13, 7' 
3 a n . , 19751 35-43 . 
The general assembly on 9 December adooted 21 reso lut ion 
on disarmament, nuclear arms race nuclear weaoons t e s t a , 
chemical weaponsf nuclear free-zone , reduction of 
mi l i tary budgets and Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
The Assembly adopted a reso lu t ion condemning the use of 
napalm, production and s t o c k - o i l i n g of a l l chemical 
weapons. 
231 . BACK (Paul ) . For God or country. Uorld View. 12, 7; 
War., 1968; 13-16. 
lis 
The churches of the world have made some statement!* 
regarding the disarmament and arms control* Aecordinq 
t o author the majority f e e l that ueapons of mass 
destruct ion should be r e s t r i c t e d and advocates the 
ppaceful use of outer space* In 1*^ 60 church bodips 
advocated non-pro l i ferat ion of nuclear ueaoons and the 
extension of the t e s t ban treaty* 
232 . BAINCS (Graham). Nuclear games in the south oac i^ lc . 
The E e o l o o i s t . 1, 18; D e c , 1971J 9-11* 
The author examines that China and France have refused 
t o s ign the t e s t ban treaty* In 1962 the French nuclear 
t e s t f a c l l i t i e a were transferred t o the south p a c i f i c , 
where B r i t i s h and American e f f o r t s had already shown the 
population to be quiet and inar t i cu la te* The Woscow 
t e s t ban treaty of 1963 i s so far the only aporoach to 
prodibl t ing nuclear t e s t i n g - but Chins and France have 
abstained* 
233 . BROtW (Bruce 3)* AtmosPher4e nuclear t e s t ing* Sc ie end 
Pub* ftff. 30 , 2? Feb*, 1974J 13-15* 
The author a nuclear chemist concludes that e f f ec t on a 
nation*8 health from rad io -ac t ive material i s considered 
t o be an increase in the incidence of Leukemia. This 
1 1 9 
a r t i c l e surveys the e f f e c t s on the oopulation of 
Austral ia over the past 25 years* Tt i s claimed that 
the explos ion could tr igger a ser ious earthquake, and 
r e l e a s e rad ioact ive debris in to the sea and s ir* 
234» D'Aniato(Anthony A*). Legal aspects of the French 
nuclpsr t e s t s * Ame* J* of Inter* Ley* l 6 , 1? 1*?67; 
66«67* 
The author examines the l e g a l factor involved in 
France's nuclear t e s t s because d i f f eren t p o l i t i c a l 
expectat ions may depend on the consensus of the 
l e g a l i t y or i l l e g a l i t y and world opinion u i H see 
whether France was act ing within her internat ional 
l e g a l r i g h t s or not* 
235. DEPTH CHARGE. New Soci* 25 , 566; »ug* 9, 1973; 323. 
Author concludes that the 1963 p a r t i a l t e s t ban treaty 
has not prevented underground t e s t ing» i t has only 
discouraged the a c q u i s i t i o n of nuclear weapons* 1963 t 
treaty required t o include unccMnmitted s t a t e s to sign 
the t e s t ban. I t a l s o points that oermanent bannino of 
a l l nuclear t e s t exolos ions* ThP agreement on l lmi t ino 
underground nuclear t e s t s to y i e l d of l e s s thsn IRT 
ki lo tons* 150 k i l o t o n s i s too high and e f f o r t s to lower 
the threshold must continue* 
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236, DtW'T SIT on th« mll»8tone« Naturt* 26fl, 70? 
Apr, 2 2 , 19701 659, 
The author conclude* that agreement has been reached 
between U»S«'U*S*S«9* on l i m i t i n g underground nuclear 
t ee ta t o y i e l d of l e s a than ISO k i lo tons* <iome orogreas 
hat been made on the o r l n o i o l e of on s i t e inspection* 
The other par t i c ipants maintained that ISO k i lo tons la 
be 
too high and e f f o r t s should/msdc t o lower th i s* 
237. EPSTEIN (u)* Nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n , the f a i l u r e of the 
review conference* Survival* 17, 6 | Nov-Dec*, 1975? 
262-269* 
The author examinps the conference t o review the 
operation of the non-oro l i f era t ion treaty t o assure 
that the treaty was being implemented resul ted in a 
confrontation between the have and the have not 
countries* The third-world non-nuclear countries 
demanded that they end underground nuclear t e s t s * 
238* G0L08LAT (3oaef)* TT9TPNET - Steps towards CT BT* 
I n s t , Res* on Pea* and Vio* 7, 1? 1977: 26-31* 
The author concludes that the par t ia l nuclear t s s t ban 
treaty of 1963 was followed In 1974 by the threshold 
1 2 1 
t s s t ban treaty U n i t i n g nuel«?8? weapons t e s t s under-
ground t o 150 k i lo tons and in 1976 by a treaty extenriino 
t h i s liiRit a l so t o explos ions for peaceful purposes* 
239 . HALF A loaf can be worse. Progressive* 41 , 5? Way, 
1977; 5-6* 
President Garter's welcome commitMpnt t o a comprehensive 
t e s t ban treaty and a treaty on underground explosions 
for peaceful purposes^ both yet not r a t i f i e d * Roth 
t r e a t i e s l imi t rather than e l iminate underground t e s t s * 
All the conferences on disarmament have had only minimal 
e f f e c t on the technolog ica l arms race and on the mult i -
faceted mi l i tary confrontation of the super-powers* 
240* HALSTFD (Thomas A*)* Uhy not a rea l nuclear t e s t ban. 
Arms Con. Today* 8, 6; 3une, I976j 1-2 . 
The author concludes that what i s r e a l l y needed i s an 
end t o a l l nuclear t e s t i n g . A complete t e s t ban would 
be a s ignal t h a t , at l e a s t after 20 years of nego t ia t ions , 
the super-powers were ready to take a s i g n i f i c a n t s t e o . 
One of the most e f f e c t i v e measures for strengthenlno the 
non-prol i ferat ion treaty would be the cessat ion of a l l 
nuclear weapons t e s t s * 
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241 . HOPWANN (P Terr«no»)« Interact ions and oerceotlona 
In the t e i t ban negot ia t ions* Inter* 5tu»?lt 1: Wj,r.| 
1976; 105-07. 
This a r t i c l e exanlnes the neoot la t lons monq U^Af 
Soviet Union and United Kingdom leading to a t e s t ban 
t r e a t y . The majority f e e l that the urgency of endlnq 
or at l e a s t l lMit lng the t e s t l n q of nuclear ueaoona uas 
expressed by these countries* They a l l are, conrerned 
about l imi t ing and r e s t r i c t i n g the use of ueaoons of 
mass des t ruc t ion . 
242. INOYK (Wartin). Austrs l ian uranltflu end non-orol l fprat lon 
regime, ftust. Q. 49, 4? D e c , 1977? 4 -8 . 
The author concludes that the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear 
weapons t o be the most ser ious hazard associated ul th 
the export of IKiustralian uranium. The strengthenino 
the non»prol l ferat ion regime, a t o t a l ban i s l i k e l y to 
be counter productive* 
243 . 30HNS0N ( U a l t e r ) . Muclesr test ing.Ame. Rep. 11, 34: 
3une 2 , 1972; 4 . 
The author concerns with Trench t e s t i n g in south 
p a c i f i c countr ies that have protested the t e s t ino 
including Aiustralla, New Ittaland and Tonga. There are 
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examples of U.S. t e s t i n g In Micronesia where radioact ive 
f a l l out was quite dangerous. 
244 . LEGUff (Col in ) . Common wealth f a l l out over nuclear 
t e s t s . Observer. 29 , 102? 3uly 29, 1973; 5. 
The author concludes that A u s t r i l i a and New Zealand 
protested against Trench nuclear t e s t the Rr l t l sh 
a t t i tude toward black i s very c l e a r . The sxamole i s 
cmimonwealth conference in which a wide range of 
cooperation i s given e . g . the fund for technical 
cooperat ion, the programme t o a s s i s t Rhodesisn rsfU9»»s, 
and other on sc ience and technology. 
245. NEJIRIMG ( S c o t t ) . Strong words from a general . Won.Rev. 
15, 2 ; Apr, 1964; 691-692. 
The author concludes that peace w i l l not arrive under 
p a r t i a l t e s t ban t r e s t y . Testing w i l l continue. He 
s t a t e s that peace w i l l never be p o s s i b l e without Chinese 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
246. NORMAN (Col in) . Test ban treaty condemned. Nature. 
250, 102; Aug. 2 , 1974; 366-67. 
The federat ion of American s c i e n t i s t s and arms control 
a s soc ia t ion have condemned the testban agre^Rent conclu-
ded by Nixon in Moscow. 
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Author concludse that a meaningful arma control meaaurp 
ahould be renagotiatad Inataad of t h l a treaty* 
247. NUCLPftR TESTING. U.N. Won. Chro. m, 9? Hot. , 1<?7!5? 
48, 54 , 68 . 
A number of oountriea proteated nuele>8r t e s t lnq carried 
out by franca in aouth p a c i f i c and t h e i r reoreaentativea 
condemned France and c a l l e d for act ion to orevent of 
t e s t i n g program. The General Aaaembly on 9 Hec, 
adopted 20 reaolut lon on dlaarmament end re lated 
questions deal ing with the nucl«°ar arm race , nuclear 
weapons t e a t a , chemical weaoona, nuclear free zonpa, 
SALT, and redustlcm of mi l i tary budget. 
248. NUCtFAR TESTING. U.N. Won. Chro. 10, 10? Nov,, l'^?'!? 
108, 111 , 118. 
There wen? many eountr lrs who spoke very atronoly 
against nuclear t e s t i n g during the ?5th ses s ion of 
U.N. General Aaasmbly. No country sooke in supoort of 
of the continuance of these t e s t s . Ph i l i oo lnps , 
Austra l ia , f lexlco, Sri Lanka etc were the part lc loanta 
in the Assembly. A r e s o l u t i o n fawourino reduction of 
mi l i tary budgets by 10^ and transferr ing t h i s aum to 
aid for developing countr iea . 
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249. NUCLE:fflR TCSTING. In aouth p e c i f l c raised in U.N. 
debate. Wat> Cand. 1, 4 : Oct . , 1972; 45 . 
This a r t i c l e s examinps the nuclpar t e s t s conducted 
by France and China in south pac i f i c* U.N. General 
Aissembly has expressed h i s deep concern about thv 
e f f e c t s of t e s t i n g in the Ocean. F?esolution8 were 
passed in the General Atesembly to ban a l l t e s t s in 
Oceans. But neither the U.S. nor Russia voted in favour 
of t h i s proposals . 
250 . ROSHCHIN ( A . ^ . ) . Nuclear t s s t ban statement. Bu l l , of 
Pea* Pro* 7, 3? 1976? 263. 
The author concludes that the problems of disarmsment 
of nuclesr weapons are not a technica l problem but one 
of a na t ion ' s r ight t o s e c u r i t y . Russia proposed the 
p a r t i a l t e s t ban treaty 13 years ago and U.S. signed i t . 
Sov ie t s hold that e coirplpte ban on nuclear t e s t s can 
only come when a l l nuclear powers agree. 
251 . STftTEWENT ON nuclear t s s t t r e a t i e s , ftrms Con. Today* 
6 , 6? 3une, I976j 4 - 5 . 
The arms control a s soc ia t ion i s opposed to the 
*threshol i* t e s t ban treaty signed in floseou between 
U.S.At. and Russia and the treaty on peaceful nuclear 
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explosions. These treaties represent a backward step 
from the goal of bannlno all nuclear tests in all 
environments* 
252. TEST SAN new hopest new hurdles. Nature. 268, 56l9j 
Aug. 4, 1977; 385. 
The United States has abandoned its programme and 
is likely to ask the Soviet Union to do the same. If 
Soviet Union really wants to go ahead with its Drogramme* 
then the United States should not be allowed to get sway 
with an excuse for stepping back from a treaty. 
UNILATERAL SAFEGUARDS 
253. DUf)S (Lloyd 3mff)» Systems reliability and national 
insecurity. Pea. Res. Rev. 7, 3j Nov, 1977? 66-83. 
The author concludes that vast majority of existing 
mass destruction weapons provide no contribution to the 
prevention of war. Supar-pouers have sought to buy 
security at the cost of huge expenditures of resources 
over the ilast 31 years, but actually they have bought 
insecurity. The simple fact is that world are less 
secure now than 1') years ago. 
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254. RIETTIMEN {3 .K. ) . Recent dewelopmente In t a c t i c a l 
nuclear ueaoons and t h e i r bearing on nuclear non-
p r o l i f e r a t i o n * Inat* nw Pea* Vio« 3 , 4: 1973? ?75-7S3. 
The author concludes that because of the decreased 
c r e d l t a b i l i t y of i t s s t r a t e g i c nuclpsr auarantee to 
west Europe's defence the t!S i s podernizlng and 
miniaturiz ing i t s t a c t i c a l nuclear ueapons by develoo-
Ing a new generation of the«i» t h s minl-ueaoons which are 
more accurate* Since such ueapons may soon be ava i l sb l e 
t o many countriea the f^ PT should be reinforced to 
guarantee i t s survival* 
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